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1.1 Background  
 
How would the competitive pressure affect productivity and welfare 
distribution of the Indian economy? Are the observed wage differentials 
between skilled and unskilled labour different from their productivity 
differentials over a decade of pursuit for the competitive market in the Indian 
economy and what is the performance of the economy over the periods? What 
would be the contribution of education process to the wage-productivity 
inequality and what would be the optimal returns to education?  Do all the 
formal activities perform better than the informal activities in India and what 
would be the gain to the economy if factors were productively allocated? 
    A rise in productivity holds the key to progress and prosperity in any 
economy. The crisis from the late Eighties along with the Gulf war in the 
beginning of 1990s pushed the Indian economy to an unprecedented crisis 
resulting in acute internal as well external imbalances. With a view to 
improving the efficiency, productivity and global competitiveness, both macro 
and microeconomic reforms were introduced in industrial, trade and financial 
policy regime. Since 1991, India has undertaken a drastic economic reform 
program, with the significant objectives of fine-tuning internal as well as 
external imbalances and enhancing global competitiveness. Though economic 
growth in the initial years of the reforms were only 0.5 per cent points higher 
than the pre-reform period, it went up to 7 per cent in the last few years, 
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showing a lagged effect of radical reforms1. Some growth accounting studies 
have shown that this growth is associated with rise in total factor productivity 
(TFP), in the service sector rather than in the manufacturing sector 
(Sivasubramonian, 2004; Bosworth et al. 2006; Mehra, (2007). Goldar and 
Mitra (2002), and Goldar and Kumari (2003) argued that the decline in factor 
productivity in manufacturing in the post-liberalization period is due to the 
lack of capacity utilization. They also found a positive relationship between 
trade openness and TFP for Indian industries. Undoubtedly productivity carves 
a special niche in the present era of Indian economic development. 
Recent experience has shown that protection of less-than-productive 
employment is a failing policy in the face of growing technological progress 
(Reddy, 2005). It is believed that the existence of a wage premium in India 
could be due to a lack of perfect labour mobility across sectors. Recently India 
has done an excellent job in the supply of skilled labour having been ranked 
12th according to The World Competitiveness Year book (2000). However, it 
has been ranked only 45th for the degree of labour market flexibility in the 
Global Competitiveness Report (1998). Despite its effort to be globally 
competitive, Indian economy is certainly lagging behind in the race. In terms 
of foreign direct investment it has averaged only around 0.5 percent during last 
decade as compared to 5-5.5 percents in China and Brazil. Similarly, India’s 
share in the world merchandise exports has been between 0.5 and 0.7 percents 
in last two decades, while that of China has been almost 4 percent. A 
competitive environment is a prerequisite condition for gaining higher 
productivity and efficiency. The main desired role of economic liberalization is 
to enhance the efficient utilization of inputs with relaxing constraints input use 
and technology choices and gains from international trade by bringing global 
competitive pressure to the economy. Increase in productivity and efficiency 
gain also puts forth the issues of wage disparity and welfare distribution.  
                                              
1 This has been termed as the J curve of liberalizations and productivity change 
according to Virmani (2005). 
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Given the heterogeneous nature of the Indian economy and with the 
changing importance of different sectors, existence of formal-informal duality 
and skilled-unskilled disparity, this study of productivity and efficiency is not 
confined to the sectoral level. The dissertation proposes a macro productivity-
efficiency analysis while taking care of the inter-linkages in the economy. This 
is extended to address a few important issues of the Indian economy, viz. 
competitive environment, income distribution, poverty, skilled-unskilled wage 
disparity and performance of formal-informal sectors. An attempt has been 
made in this dissertation to capture these above-mentioned issues with the help 




1.2 Research Issues   
 
Productivity plays an important role in accelerating the pace of growth. For all 
practical purposes it is sufficient to understand productivity in terms of the rate 
of efficiency with which resources are converted into the production of goods 
and services what satisfies human wants of the society. The combination of 
inputs are subject to changes as a result of changing relative prices, changing 
technical knowledge or changing output if returns to scale are not constant. 
The change in total factor productivity (TFP) is interpreted as: (i) the rate of 
change of an index of outputs divided by an index of inputs (Jorgenson and 
Griliches, 1967) or (ii) a rate of shift in a production function (Tinbergen, 
1942; Solow, 1957). Productivity is a measurement of efficiency of production.  
The productivity analysis used in the dissertation deviates from the 
standard neo-classical growth accounting by combining it with frontier 
analysis to accommodate inefficiencies (see ten Raa and Mohnen, 2002)2.  An 
analysis of inefficiencies is critical towards an understanding of developing 
                                              
2 See ten Raa and Shestalova, (2006) for a survey on various measurement 
issues of total factor productivity. 
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economies. Farrell (1957) argued that sub-optimality in productivity 
achievement is because the firm has chosen inappropriate combination of 
factors and inefficient use of the combination, i.e. allocative and technical 
inefficiencies respectively. Literature on frontier analysis assigns TFP to 
technical change and efficiency change catching-up with the frontier (see Färe, 
Grosskopf, Norris and Zhang, 1994), while neo-classical efficiency is the 
reallocation of resources. The basic model in this dissertation considers the 
three sources of productivity-growth: efficient utilization of available resources 
(Debreu, 1951), technical progress by the Solow residual (Solow, 1957) and 
gain from terms of trade by re-orientation of trade. The analytical tool in the 
dissertation is based on a general equilibrium-activity analysis. Following 
Negishi (1960) welfare maximization subject to input, trade and domestic 
consumption constraints describes the competitive equilibrium. The economy 
at the sub-optimal allocation is pushed towards its best production possibility 
frontier, the potential of the economy. The gap between the potential (optimal 
allocation) and the actual one is a measure for the inefficiency in the economy. 
Competitive input prices reflect factor productivity. Variants of this model are 
used in three different studies of this thesis. Incorporation of input-output 
framework captures the inter-sectoral linkages. The social accounting matrix 
(SAM), which plays an important role in establishing inter-linkages in the 
economy, provides basic data set for our model. This matrix is a combination 
of national accounts statistics, input-output analysis and household income 
distribution for a particular period3.   
Chapter 2 discusses the gains in efficiency and productivity due to 
competitive pressure, and its distributional effects. Efficient utilization of the 
available resources, technical progress and free trade constitute the sources of 
growth. Welfare would increase under competition, but the income distribution 
would become more skewed.  The best result of the productivity-efficiency 
gain would be once the country that is marked by inefficiencies is pushed to its 
                                              
3 See Pyatt, et al. (1977), Pyatt and Round (1979) and Pradhan, et al. (2006) for 
details on social accounting matrix. 
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frontier by maximizing total welfare of the economy. The resultant competitive 
factor as well as commodity prices would force the households to re-adjust 
their consumption and income, which may lead to losers and winners among 
the households. The economy is classified into 21 production sectors. There 
are four rural and five urban occupational household groups. 
A poverty analysis is incorporated into the study. The FGT poverty 
measure is used (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984), which is suitable to 
estimate group-wise poverty. The measurement of poverty requires an 
estimation of the income distribution within the each group. For within group 
distribution a lognormal frequency distribution is used. The optimum solutions 
of our general equilibrium model yields set of new relative prices and mean 
income of household groups, which are used to calculate the changes in 
poverty line and mean income from the observed level. The inequality is 
measured by the Gini coefficient. The reference period of our analysis is 1994, 
the beginning of drastic liberalization era. The study establishes a positive 
effect of competitive market on productivity gain and income inequality and 
the opposite on poverty.    
Chapter 3 evaluates wage inequality and efficiency of the economy in 
the face of a competitive pressure. The analysis covers two time periods: 1994, 
the beginning of liberalization era and end period is almost a decade later, 
2002. The post-liberalization period is marked by a rise in returns to higher 
education due to increase productivity of services and skilled-based industries.  
There has also been an increased supply of labour force in the middle level of 
education due to significant performance of basic education. This has led to 
almost stagnant change in skill premium between 1994 and 2002. Competition 
would lead the economy to gain in the productivity and to re-orientation of 
market-based supply and demand of skills. A perfectly competitive 
environment is simulated for both the periods by pushing the economy to its 
production frontier. Competitive wages would reflect labour productivity. 
Ratio of competitive wages of skilled to unskilled labour defines the 
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productivity inequality. Observed wage inequality is evaluated by comparing it 
with the productivity inequality.  
Education process is incorporated into the productivity analysis as a 
factor influencing human capital formation (skilled labour supply). A simple 
two-period dynamic model is used in our frontier-productivity analysis to take 
care of skill transformation and capital formation over time period. Optimum 
education would lead to higher entry of labour force to education in the first 
period and leading to increased supply of skilled labour in the second period. 
This would influence both present and future relative wages. The education 
process also facilitates us in deriving returns to education. Competitive market 
indicates the potential of the economy. Performance of the economy compared 
to its potential marks the efficiency of the economy. We notice that efficiency 
of the economy is lower than its potential in both the periods; however, it is 
much lower in the second period. 
The study shows that productivity inequality is significantly higher than 
the wage inequality in the initial period and is lower in the second period. This 
is due to the decline in competitive skilled wage and increase in unskilled wage 
relative to the observed in the second period. Productivity inequality (relative 
productivity) is sensitive to the degree of elasticity of substitution between two 
types of labour. The productivity inequality between skilled and unskilled 
labour is seen to be significantly higher than the wage inequality in the initial 
period due to increased productivity of skilled labour. However, productivity 
inequality declines in the second period and it even remains below the 
observed wage inequality. Productivity inequality also declines with a higher 
elasticity of substitution in the first period because of rising productivity of 
unskilled labour.  
A decomposition exercise is conducted that captures the importance of 
each factor, e.g. trade efficiency, human capital formation, physical capital 
formation and static allocative efficiency (efficiency due to allocation of 
resources in a period), in the aggregate effect of competitive pressure on the 
change in wage differentials and performance of the economy vis-à-vis the 
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observed. The decomposition approach is based on an extended Fisher Index 
(Ang et al, 2004), which is a geometric average of all the combinations of the 
Laspeyres and Paasche indices.  Trade efficiency plays significant role in 
raising the productivity inequality. However, an increase in the supply of 
skilled labour due to human capital formation leads to lowering of productivity 
inequality in the second period. Lack of trade efficiency is also a crucial factor 
for the lower efficiency of the Indian economy in both the periods. Lack of 
trade efficiency, in particular, is found to be mainly responsible for the lower 
efficiency of the economy. However, larger accumulations of human and 
physical capitals, not being matched by enough demand in the second period 
are also crucial in reducing the efficiency. Competitive pressure would remove 
the existing inefficiencies of the economy by the expansion of final demand. 
Chapter 4 attempts to evaluate the relative performance of formal and 
informal sectors in India, which produce the same commodity with different 
technologies. In order to capture the differentials we evaluate their productivity 
levels. Traditionally, formal sectors and informal sectors are, though, supposed 
to cater to same consumer demand, yet play different role in wage formation, 
employment generation and hence income distribution because of their nature 
of production. Informal sector is marked by less or no tax payment, less capital 
endowment, lower technology, lower wage and producing wage goods. 
Generally productivity is analysed using observed input and output prices. 
Observed prices are generally not efficient as they are marked by inefficiencies 
and distortions of several kinds. The key theoretical contribution of this paper 
is that recognizing the intersectoral linkages in the economy, the competitive 
general equilibrium prices are computed; these signal the productivities. These 
prices are used to compute the productivity levels of the formal and informal 
activities.  
Competitive prices result in complete specialization in production of a 
homogeneous commodity by a relatively more productive sector. Considering 
the fact that substitutability and mobility assumption of factors of production 
plays significant role in deciding relative performance at competitive prices, 
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some relevant assumptions are made in this direction. It’s not possible for 
informal capital to perform as formal capital; while other way around is 
possible. On the other hand, formal labour (regular) can enter into the informal 
labour market (casual) both in formal and informal sectors when they lose their 
job, but the opposite is not possible. This asymmetry generates a nonnegative 
competitive premium for both formal capital and regular labour. The analysis 
shows that formal activities are more productive than the informal ones except 




Chapter 2   
 








After an economic crisis, India resorted to a major program of reform in 1991, 
to improve efficiency, productivity and global competitiveness. Macro- and 
microeconomic reforms were introduced in industrial, trade and financial 
policies (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1993). The Indian economy seemed to be 
responsive to the reform measures undertaken during 1991-96; it featured 
globalisation and liberalization. GDP grew more than 6.5 percent per annum 
during this period. However, reform commentators believe that India’s agenda 
is still unfinished. Bajpai and Sachs (1997), Fischer (2002) and others advocate 
a greater momentum of reform, with more openness in trade, deregulation of 
industries, and agricultural and labour market reforms. It is expected that the 
further reform will spur the economy to reallocate its resources efficiently and 
thus raise productivity. Once the economy operates on its frontier, competitive 
factor rewards would change the households’ income and consumption and 
thus the welfare distribution. We analyse the consequences with the aid of a 
general equilibrium model built around a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM). 
In the tradition of Kaldor (1956) and Kuznets (1955), Papanek and Kyn 
(1986) and Fields (1991), Cogneau and Guenard (2002), discuss the issue if 
growth creates or absorbs inequality. Economic growth creates employment 
opportunities and thus changes the income distribution. Indian industries were 
inefficient and hampered by pervasive government control. Although India has 
an impressive record of growth since the late 1980s, it still faces massive 
                                              
* This chapter is based to a great extent on ten Raa and Sahoo (2007).  
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poverty and inequality. Many studies, viz. Kawani and Subbarao (1990), Jain 
and Tendulkar (1990), Datt and Ravallion (1992), and Ravallion and Datt 
(1996), emphasized the influence of growth on poverty in India.  
The Indian economy is still well within its production possibility 
frontier. The inefficiency can be measured by the degree by which the net 
output vector could be extended given the resource and technology constraints 
(ten Raa, 1995). Despite many sceptical views on free trade versus growth 
(Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999; Rodrik, 1999), there has been strong evidence 
that free trade enhances growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Edwards, 1992). 
Trade and development economists have exposited that in the absence of 
market failure and distortions, trade stimulates growth and improves welfare 
(Bhagwati, 1994; Srinivasan and Bhagawati, 1999). Competitive pressure can 
push the economy towards its production possibility set and trade can augment 
this set. Thus, the economy becomes not only productively efficient (on its 
production possibility frontier), but also allocatively efficient (on the utility 
possibility frontier) (Srinivasan and Bhagwati, 1999). 
Few studies have analysed the sources of productivity growth in a 
general equilibrium framework. Ten Raa and Mohnen (2002) found a shift of 
the source of productivity growth from technical change to the terms of trade 
effect for the Canadian economy. Shestalova (2002) used a new technological 
measure to analyse the total factor productivity (TFP) performance of the three 
large trading economies endogenizing not only the domestic prices, but also 
the terms of trade. Ten Raa and Pan (2005) have analysed the personal income 
distribution using an inter-provincial model in the Chinese economy. We 
derive the sources of income for different household groups (or ownership of 
factor endowments), and their expenditure patterns from the Indian SAM. As 
we confine our analysis to the income distribution of households at the national 
level, we adjust the weights attached to the household in the welfare function, 
comparing the computed propensities to consume to the observed ones, rather 
than the trade surpluses in the cited studies. In the equilibrium, the ratio of new 
propensity to consume to the observed one should be same for each household 
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group. This is because, if the household’s propensity to consume at the 
optimum exceeds benchmark propensity to consume more than the other 
household, then the general equilibrium welfare maximization requires that 
former household should be assigned with higher consumption share than the 
later.  This is compatible with the welfare maximization program that shows 
that a competitive equilibrium can be represented through a welfare optimum 
with non-zero welfare weights (consumption weights) such that all consumers 
satisfy their budget constraints (Negishi 1960).  
The rest of the paper is divided into five sections. The theoretical model 
is presented in the Section 2. Section 3 analyses the basic data set. Section 4 
briefly describes the analysis of poverty and inequality measures in our 
framework. Results and implications of the model are discussed in the Section 
5, while Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.2 The Methodology 
 
The benchmark data set describes the Indian economy for the fiscal year 1994-
95. The model distinguishes 21 production sectors. Four rural and five urban 
household groups are classified by their main source of income. Households 
have welfare function of the Leontief type, that is, the observed consumption 
bundles are presumed to be preferred by the household. We make the small 
country assumption, under which producers take the world prices of the 
commodities4. The pattern of trade will be endogenous, but the level of imports 
is controlled by the observed deficit on the balance of payment. Capital, 
labour, agricultural land and the deficit are considered to constitute the 
“endowments” of the economy. The model assumes that the competitive 
                                              
4 India’s share in world merchandise exports and imports in value term have been 
only 1.1 percent and 1.4 percent respectively; its shares in world exports and imports 




market allows labour to move freely among the sectors. However, we assume 
that capital and land are sector-specific.5  
Each household group has a consumption demand vector, fhdhD, where D is 
the scalar of total consumption demand, fh is the vector of consumption shares 
of the commodities and dh represents the consumption weight attached to the 
household group. The model maximizes total final private consumption subject 
to the commodity, factor and trade deficit constraints, while preserving the 
compositions of the vectors of private consumption of the household groups. 
The other components of final demand, government consumption and 
investment, are fixed in the model. The shadow prices are used to derive the 
competitive income of each household group. The implied competitive 
propensities to consume are matched to the observed ones, by adjusting the 
consumption weights given to the households. The allocations of activity and 
shadow prices that are finally obtained constitute the general equilibrium 
(Negishi, 1960). 
The SAM provides a consistent data framework for economy-wide models 
with detailed accounts for industries, categories of working persons, institutional 
sub-sectors, and various socio-economic household groups. The rows in the SAM 
state the receipts (or income) of the different accounts and the columns the 
expenditures (or costs). Table 2.1 gives a bird’s eye view of the SAM we have 
used for our analysis. The input-output table is in the first cell. The first column 
also shows how factor endowments owned by the different household groups 
contribute to the production process (the value added cell). The second column 
shows the factor incomes returned, by ownership. The first row displays 
household consumption and the other component of final demand. 
The basic idea of the efficiency gain on the frontier can be illustrated 
graphically. This frontier can be reached by optimal allocations of factors of 
                                              
5 In an economy like India, capital and land may not be mobile in the medium-run. 




production across the sectors and by re-allocation of trade with the rest of the 
world (Figure 2.1).  
 















































































In Figure 2.1, y and D0f denote the actual production and domestic final 
demand, on the international trade budget line. As shown by ten Raa and 





















Figure 2.1: Movement towards the frontier and 
efficiency gain 
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Notice that the optimal pattern of trade is reversed in Figure 2.1. The following 
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Parameters and exogenous variables: 
 
fh : column vector of h
th household's consumption share (21-dimensional)   
dh : a scalar of share of consumption demand of each h
th household in total    
consumption demand   
e : a unit row vector 
A: a 21x21-dimensional matrix of intermediate flow coefficients 
g:  a 21-dimensional vector of fixed final demand comprising of 
government consumption demand, investment demand. 
K:  a 21-dimension column vector of sector specific capital stock 
N: total land endowment in the economy 
L:  total labour endowment in the economy 
k: a diagonal matrix with sector-specific technical coefficients of capital 
n: a diagonal matrix with sector-specific technical coefficients of land 
l : row vector of technical coefficients of labour 
π :   a 19-dimension row vector of terms of trade in dollar term.  
t




x: a 21 dimensional column vector of economy's output 
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D: scalar of overall private consumption demand in the economy 
t: a 19 dimensional vector of net exports 
 
The dual problem reads: 
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The primal problem expands the final private consumption demand (D) 
given the household groups weights, dh. The weights will be adjusted as to 
equilibrate the model. The first constraint is the commodity constraint, i.e. the 
material balance, while next three constraints are for capital, land and labour, 
respectively. The fourth constraint states that the net exports valued at world 
prices cannot conflict the existing trade deficit.  
In the dual problem shadow prices p, r1, r2, w and e are for output, capital, 
land, labour and purchasing power parity, respectively. The first dual 
constraint reflects that the factor cost of production exceeds value added. For 
active sectors, there is equality (ten Raa, 1995). The second dual constraint 
takes care of the price normalization. The last constraint equalizes the prices of 
the tradable sectors with their opportunity cost under the assumption of free 
trade. 
The idea is to compute the propensity to consume at the competitive prices 
for each household group and to equalize relative propensities to consume with 
the observed ones. If the propensity to consume of the first household group 
turns out disproportionately high, its higher consumption demand signals that 
we have attributed too much welfare to this group in the social welfare 
function. We adjust the weight (downward in this case) and re-compute the 
optimal allocation given by linear program. Through an iteration process, we 
arrive at the optimum pattern of consumption and income for each household 
group. In a solution to the linear program, the households consume h hpf d D , 
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whereas their incomes are 1 2
h h h
K N L
r K r N w Lθ θ θ+ + , given the household 




Nθ  and 
h
Lθ  of the capital, land and labour 
endowments. The implied propensities to consume are 
1
1 2( ) ( )/( )
h h h
h h h K N Lm d pf d D r K r N w Lθ θ θ= + + . The observed propensities to consume, 
0 ( )
h
m d , valued at competitive prices for current consumption are similar, but 
with the optimal consumption baskets h hf d D  replaced by the observed baskets. 
If a household category h has a low optimal propensity to consume, we rerun 
the linear program, giving it more weight in final consumption, dh. There are 
eight independent such weights (one of the nine weights is determined by the 
adding-up condition) and the condition that nine household groups have equal 
optimal/observed ratios of the propensities to consume amounts to eight 
equations. In equilibrium, the optimal/observed ratios of the propensities to 
consume are the same for all household groups. Mathematically, the 
equilibrium is found as in ten Raa and Pan (2005).  
 
2.3 Data  
 
We use the SAM of Pradhan, Sahoo and Saluja (1999), with some adjustments. 
The intermediate flows in the SAM are based on the commodity-by-
commodity matrix, which we have aggregated from the original 60 
commodities down to 21. The economy is classified into 21 production sectors 
to take care of important economic activities. `Food-grains' has been separated 
from the rest of the agriculture sector for its vital role in poverty. 'Coal and 
lignite', and 'crude oil and natural gas' are the two components of primary 
energy. The primary energy requires higher investment in exploration and also 
due to high domestic demand a substantial amount of it is imported. 
The sectors in the manufacturing are divided in such a way that capital 
goods are separated from consumer items like `food articles and beverages', 
`textiles', etc. in view of different capital structures. For the rapid development 
of the economy, the `cement and other non-metallic mineral products', which 
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are basically inputs to the construction sector have assumed importance. Their 
growth will give a fillip to the crucial housing sector as well. `Fertilizers' as a 
sector has got a big role to play in influencing the agriculture. The `petroleum 
products' are kept separately as these are by-products of the one of the 
important energy sectors, `crude oil and natural gases'. They are also crucial 
energy sectors whose prices have so far been administered and the economy is 
very sensitive to their price changes. 
Households are classified according to their principal sources of income. 
There are four rural and five urban occupational household groups. The 1996 
MIMAP-India Survey (Pradhan and Roy, 2003) provides the information on 
the factors of production, and the income and consumption distributions. Table 
2.2 shows that the bulk of rural income derives from agriculture, while urban 
income stems nearly exclusively from the other activities. The rural 
agricultural households derive around 87 percent of their income from the 
agriculture. The other rural household groups derive between 87 and 89 
percent of their income from non-agricultural activities.  
 
Table 2.2: Sources of Income for Household Groups (in percentage) 
 
Household Categories Agriculture 
Non-
agriculture Total 
All-India 32.14 67.86 100 
Rural    
Self employed in agriculture 87.12 12.88 100 
Self employed in non-agriculture 12.87 87.13 100 
Agriculture wage earners 88.52 11.48 100 
Non-agriculture wage earners 10.32 89.68 100 
Other Households 12.53 87.47 100 
Total Rural 55.66 44.34 100 
Urban    
Agriculture households 74.91 25.09 100 
Self employed in non-agriculture 0.95 99.05 100 
Salaried earners 0.9 99.1 100 
Non-agriculture wage earners 2.19 97.81 100 
Other households 1.03 98.97 100 
Total Urban 2.46 97.54 100 
Source: Pradhan and Roy, 2003. 
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Table 2.3 shows that the urban ‘salaried class’ (12% of the population) 
secures a big chunk of the wage bill (34%), whereas ‘agriculture labour’ (22% 
of the population) gets a meagre part (17%). The small ‘non-agriculture self-
employed’ household group (5.4% of the population) lays claim to the bulk of 
capital income (33%). The rural ‘cultivator’ household group also enjoys a 
great share of capital income (20%), but they are many (24% of the 
population). This group dominates agricultural land. 
 
Table 2.3: Percentages of income across household groups by sources 







Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Rural         
Cultivator 24.22 13.36 20.46 78.49 23.92 
Agriculture Labour 22.08 16.85 0.46 0.56 9.97 
Artisans 13.85 10.01 14.81 15.5 12.12 
Other households 14.76 14.8 3.76 4.18 10.21 
Urban         
Agriculture 
Households 




5.4 6.03 32.69 0 
12.97 
Salaried 12.19 34.34 14.26 0 24.04 
Non-agriculture 
Labour 
2.81 2.96 3.54 0 
2.74 
Other households 3.44 0.9 8.4 0 2.96 
Source: Calculated from the SAM for India, Pradhan et al (1999) 
 
 
Table 2.4 reveals that rural households have a rather uniform pattern of 
consumption, with the bulk spent on primary, mainly agricultural, goods. The 





Table 2.4: Composition of Household Expenditure  
 




Rural        
Cultivator 41.16 26.10 32.74 100 0.12 
Agriculture Labour 47.17 25.71 27.11 100 0.06 
Artisans 41.18 28.08 30.75 100 0.06 
Other households 42.23 29.07 28.70 100 0.05 
Urban      
Agriculture       
Households 
43.77 23.76 32.47 100 0.01 
Non-agriculture Self-
employed 
35.07 24.86 40.07 100 0.06 
Salaried 24.63 31.36 44.00 100 0.11 
Non-agriculture 
Labour 
44.37 25.32 30.31 100 0.02 
Other households 19.08 27.46 53.46 100 0.02 
Source: Calculated from the SAM for India, Pradhan et al (1999) 
 
The benchmark coefficients for the factor input are given in Table 2.5. The 
Annual Survey of Industry (ASI) (Government of India, 1994-95) gives 
information on the number of employees engaged in the different registered 
manufacturing industries and their total emoluments. We compute the average 
wage rate for each registered industry. Because of the difficulty in procuring 
information on unregistered industries, we apply the wage rates of the 
registered industries to the unregistered ones. Application of the wage rates to 
the SAM based labour value added statistics, yields estimates of the numbers 
of employees in the manufacturing industries. Unfortunately, ASI does not 
give information on agriculture sectors, mining and quarrying, construction 
and service sectors. Using the information on the numbers of main and 
marginal workers engaged in these activities given by the Government of India 
(1991), we compute the benchmark wage rate for these sectors. An 
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unemployment rate of 6 percent is applied to get the labour constraint in the 
model6. 
 














S1 Food grains 0.065 4.88 0.276 0.065 1.00 1.00 
S2 Other agriculture 0.075 5.75 0.302 0.065 1.00 1.00 
S3 Crude oil, natural gas 0.594 2.70  0.089 1.00  
S4 
Other Mining and 
quarrying 0.454 2.03  0.089 1.00  
S5 Food products, etc. 0.133 0.48  0.172 1.00  
S6 Textiles 0.117 0.63  0.262 1.00  
S7 
Other traditional 
manufacturing. 0.162 0.58  0.289 1.00  
S8 Petroleum products 0.268 0.15  0.461 1.00  
S9 Finished petrochemicals 0.276 0.13  0.461 1.00  
S10 Fertilizer 0.230 0.20  0.365 1.00  
S11 Other chemicals 0.225 0.23  0.365 1.00  
S12 Non-metallic products 0.170 0.51  0.236 1.00  
S13 Basic metal industries 0.156 0.18  0.444 1.00  
S14 Metallic products 0.157 0.55  0.309 1.00  
S15 Capital goods 0.175 0.49  0.449 1.00  
S16 Other Manufacturing 0.269 0.70  0.342 1.00  
S17 Construction 0.075 0.46  0.810 1.00  
S18 Electricity 0.277 0.30  0.383 1.00  
S19 Infrastructure service 0.377 0.80  0.311 1.00  
S20 Financial service 0.531 0.75  0.311 1.00  
S21 Other services 0.243 1.65  0.289 1.00  
Source: Calculated from the SAM for India, Pradhan et al (1999) 
* Wages are calculated from Annual Survey of India (various issues), Government of 
India (1991) and rent to capital and land are assumed to be one at observed level. 
 
 
We assume that land is used in agriculture only and we assume it is fully 
utilized. We assume that capital and land rents are uniform across sectors. 
Table 2.6 shows the capacity utilization rates for different sectors, taken from 
different sources. 
                                              
6 The unemployment rate is the ratio of unemployed to the total labour force based on 














S1 Food grains 81 Gupta, et al (2000) for irrigation 
S2 Other agriculture 81 Gupta, et al (2000) for irrigation 
S3 Crude oil, natural gas 88 Indiainfoline.com (2003) 
S4 
Other Mining and 
quarrying 85 Government of India (1996) for coal 
S5 Food products, etc. 49 Government of India (1992a) 
S6 Textiles 69 Government of India (1992a) 
S7 
Other traditional 
manufacturing. 58 Government of India (2001) 
S8 Petroleum products 88 Indiainfoline.com (2003) 
S9 
Finished 
petrochemicals 78 Government of India (2001) 
S10 Fertilizer 90 Trivedi et al.(1998 ) 
S11 Other chemicals 78 Directories-today.com (2003) 
S12 Non-metallic products 71 
Government of India (1992b) for 
Cement industry 
S13 Basic metal industries 78 
Government of India (1992b) for 
aluminium industry 
S14 Metal products 55 Government of India (2001) 
S15 Capital goods 83 Government of India (2001) 
S16 Other Manufacturing 78 Government of India (2001) 
S17 Construction 75 Indiainfoline.com (2003) 
S18 Electricity 41 Economic Survey, 2000-2001,  
S19 Infrastructure service 75 Indiainfoline.com (2003) 
S20 Financial service 100 Authors’ own assumption 
S21 Other services 52 Govt. of India (1987) 
 
 
2.4 Income Distribution and Poverty 
 
This section of the study is based on Pradhan and Sahoo (2003). The 
measurement of poverty requires an estimation of the income distribution 
within the each group. The distribution will be used to evaluate the group 
poverty incidence. The implicit assumption is that, given the within-group 
variances, the intra-group distribution changes proportionally with the change 












= ; parameterised by the log-mean µ 
and the standard deviation σ. 
The FGT poverty measure (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984) is suitable 
























  nh is the population size in household 
group h (i.e. occupational class), qh the number of people below poverty line, 
‘z’ is the poverty line7 and h
i
Y  is the income of the ith person in household 
group ‘h’. α is a measure of poverty aversion; the most commonly used values 
are 0, 1 and 2. P0 is the ‘head-count ratio measure’, P1 is the ‘poverty-gap 
measure’ and P2 the ‘distributionally sensitive measure.’ In this paper, we use 
only the head-count ratio of poverty measure; it is simply the fraction of 
households living below the poverty line. 
When income distribution is given in the form of group data, the poverty 
measure requires a continuous income density functions, one for each 












∫ . By assumption of the lognormal 













, where N is the standard normal distribution. 
For each household group we estimate of µ  and σ  using the MIMAP-
India household survey data (see Table 2.7). We estimate the observed level P0 
for household groups by applying information on income distribution from the 
                                              
7 Poverty lines for rural and urban are taken from Pradhan and Roy (2003). 
Government of India (1993) estimated (nutritional) poverty line for Rural and Urban 
India for the year 1973-74 based on the pattern of consumption expenditures of 
households. Pradhan and Roy (2003) revised the 1993-94 poverty lines by using 
consumer price index number for agriculture labour and industrial workers for rural 
and urban areas respectively. 
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SAM. However, this estimated observed poverty ratios at the observed level 
could be different from that of officially reported by the Pradhan and Roy 
(2003) due to differences in assumption regarding distributions and other 
adjustments in the SAM (see Table 2.8).  
 




( µ ) 
Standard deviation 
(σ ) 
Rural   
Cultivator 5.85 0.76 
Agriculture Labour 5.33 0.60 
Artisan 5.55 0.79 
Other household 5.93 0.72 
Urban   




Salaried Class 6.68 0.76 
Casual Labour 5.54 0.82 
Other Household 6.47 1.35 
Source: estimated from Pradhan and Roy, 2003  
 





Rural 0.3943 0.3979 
Cultivator 0.3679 0.2946 
Agriculture labour 0.5497 0.5675 
Artisan 0.3586 0.4404 
Other households 0.2041 0.2451 
Urban 0.2837 0.2245 




Salaried class 0.1424 0.1038 
Casual Labour 0.6103 0.5910 
Other household 0.2135 0.2912 
*Pradhan and Roy, 2003 (MIMAP-India Survey). 
 
The optimum solutions of our general equilibrium model yields set of 
new relative prices and mean income of household groups, which are used to 
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calculate the changes in poverty line and mean income ( µ )8 from the observed 
level. We measure inequality by the Gini coefficient. 
 
 
2.5 Results and Implications 
 
The main objectives of the economic reforms in India have been to accelerate 
the growth of the economy by removing the distortions, domestic as well as 
trade, and to mitigate the poverty situation. Table 2.9 shows that since 1983 the 
rural poverty ratio is higher than the urban. The poverty ratio declines since the 
late eighties. 
 
Table 2.9: Poverty Head-count Ratio   
Year Rural Urban Total 
1973-74 56.4 49.0 54.9 
1977-78 53.1 45.2 51.3 
1983 45.7 40.8 44.5 
1987-88 39.1 38.2 38.9 
1993-94 37.3 32.4 36.0 
1999-00 27.1 23.6 26.1 
2007 * 21.1 15.1 19.3 
  Source: Government of India (2003)  
*Poverty projection for 2007. 
 
 
If these policies of economic reform were realized to the fullest theoretical 
extent, the competitive pressure would twist the distribution of income. The 
Indian economy could expand by a factor 1.42, indicating that it operates at an 
efficiency level of 70 percent.9 This would come with a great increase of in the 
Gini coefficient, from the observed 0.2739 to 0.3424. However, poverty (the 
head-count ratio P0 defined in Section 4) would decline for the overall rural as 
                                              
8 Our general equilibrium model provides the income for each group. If the log 
variances are known, then log means can be calculated from the following 
relationship µ = ln(y) - ½σ2, where y is the arithmetic mean income, σ2  is log 
variance and µ is the log mean (Dervis, de Melo and Robinson, 1984). 
9 As 1/1.42 = 0.70. 
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well the overall urban households (see Table 2.10). The decline is quite 
significant for the urban household and marginal for the rural households.  
 
Table 2.10: Household consumption weights, income inequality and 
poverty head-count ratio 
 







Rural    -0.62 
Cultivator 0.792 0.931 1.12 2.44 
Rural Agricultural labour 0.795 0.935 1.13 3.51 
Artisan 1.072 1.261 1.52 -11.69 
Rural Other 0.881 1.036 1.25 -2.10 
Urban    -11.38 
Urban farmer 1.157 1.360 1.64 -17.39 
Urban Non agricultural 
self 1.458 1.714 2.07 -16.72 
Urban Salary 0.996 1.171 1.41 -5.57 
Urban Casual labour 1.196 1.406 1.70 -23.86 
Urban Other 1.513 1.779 2.15 -15.42 
Gini Coefficient 0.2739   0.3424 
Expansion vector 1.00   1.42 
 
When the economy is allowed to be fully competitive, factors are fully 
utilized and the mobile factor, labour, is reallocated to the sectors with strong 
demand. The assumption of labour mobility gives rise to a single competitive 
wage rate. It is seen to be lower than the benchmark average wage (See Table 
2.11). The rents to capital and land are determined by the interplay of demand 
and supply of each sector; and differ by industries. We observe that the 
demand for capital is stronger than that for labour and land. Land used in the 
sector ‘other agriculture’ is non-binding in the optimum, yielding a zero 





Table 2.11: Change in output, prices of factors and commodities 
 
Ratio of Optimum to Benchmark 
Factor Prices Sectors 





S1 Food grains 0.92 0.111  1.005 1.000 
S2 Other agriculture 0.92 0.00  1.005 0.766 
S3 Crude oil, natural gas 0.92  0.94 1.005 1.136 
S4 
Other Mining and 
quarrying 0.92  1.04 1.005 1.176 
S5 Food products, etc. 0.92  2.43 1.005 2.041 
S6 Textiles 0.92  2.72 1.005 1.449 
S7 
Other traditional 
manufacturing. 0.92  2.86 1.005 1.724 
S8 Petroleum products 0.92  1.36 1.005 1.136 
S9 Finished petrochemicals 0.92  1.56 1.005 1.282 
S10 Fertilizer 0.92  1.45 1.005 1.111 
S11 Other chemicals 0.92  1.70 1.005 1.282 
S12 Non-metallic products 0.92  2.25 1.005 1.408 
S13 Basic metal industries 0.92  2.06 1.005 1.282 
S14 Metallic products 0.92  3.21 1.005 1.818 
S15 Capital goods 0.92  2.36 1.005 1.205 
S16 Other Manufacturing 0.92  1.96 1.005 1.282 
S17 Construction* 0.92   0.610 1.062 
S18 Electricity* 0.92   0.527 1.362 
S19 Infrastructure service 0.92  1.89 1.005 1.333 
S20 Financial service 0.92  1.26 1.005 1.000 
S21 Other services 0.92  4.10 1.005 1.923 
* These are the non-tradable sectors. 
 
Rent on capital in all the industries other than the intensive-intensive 
primary sectors would increase, viz. agricultural sectors (S1 and S2), ‘crude oil 
and natural gas’ (S3) and, ‘other mining and quarrying’ (S4), and non-tradable 
sectors viz. ‘construction’ (S17) and ‘electricity’ (S18) (See Table 2.10). We 
observe that agriculture sector has no comparative advantage. Agricultural 
output would not increase or drops (in the ‘other agriculture’ sector). Labour is 
thus released to the manufacturing and service sectors in which enjoy a strong 
comparative advantage. This observation is very close to that of Wood and 
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Calandrino (2000). Labour is absorbed by the sectors with low capacity 
utilization rates. 
As competitive factor prices of capital increase more than the other factors, 
we expect that household groups owning more capital stand to gain. Table 5 
shows that among rural household groups, the ‘cultivator’ households own the 
most capital as well as land. Their income would decline though, because 
competitive land rent is low. The low competitive wage and the near non-
existent of capital and land rents in agricultural sectors adversely effect the 
income of the rural ‘agriculture labour’ and ‘cultivator’ classes. Only the 
‘artisan’ household group stands to gain. The worst affected household group 
in the economy is the rural ‘agricultural labour’, which has very low share of 
capital and large labour endowment. 
Urban household groups fare better under competition. The ‘salaried class’ 
with maximal labour endowment experiences lowest gain in income, while 
greatest gain is enjoyed by the ‘non-agricultural self-employed’ household 
group, which own capital (See Table 2.5 and 2.10).  
The wide income disparity between the rural and urban household groups 
gives rise to increase in the Gini coefficient. Adverse income effects among 
most rural household groups explain the low gain in the rural poverty ratio. 
Only the ‘artisan’ household group shows a significant decline in poverty; the 
‘agricultural labour’ suffers heavily from increase in poverty ratio (See Table 
2.10). The poverty ratio increases by around 19 percent for rural ‘agriculture 
labour’ household group. As the ratio is already high for this group, (0.55 
according to Table 8), the contribution is disastrous to this group. On the other 




The efficiency pursuit of the Indian economy comes at the cost of adverse 
income effects, particularly among the rural household groups. The income 
distribution would become more skewed. Households dependent on labour and 
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land tend to suffer. The urban household groups attain a better welfare 
distribution, with significant decline in the poverty headcount ratio. Not so for 
the rural household groups; the only rural household group, which stands to 
decline in poverty, is the ‘artisan’. The worst victim of competition is expected 
be the ‘agricultural labour’. Similarly, among the urban household groups, the 
relative gain for ‘salaried class’ is low. 
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Chapter 3   
 
Competitive environment, wage inequality and efficiency of 





Issue for developing countries is the skilled-unskilled gap and it gathers 
currency once these countries attempt to liberalize their economies in the 
pursuit of a competitive market and improved efficiency. Besides international 
trade and technology change, as widely accepted, human capital formation also 
significantly contributes to the wage inequality in these countries. Tinbergen 
(1975) argued that the opposing effects of technology (skilled labour demand) 
and education (skilled labour supply) on the relative wage determine the 
inequality. Competitive environment can affect both the demand and supply of 
skilled labour and hence the education process. Normally, wages paid to the 
skilled and unskilled labour may not be according to their productivities, which 
are evaluated by the competitive wages, while the economy might be 
performing below its potential. This study attempts to capture all these issues 
for the Indian economy focusing on the role of human capital formation.  
For long, Indian industries were characterized by inefficiency, high 
costs and uneconomical means of production with pervasive government 
control. With a view to improving efficiency and global competitiveness, 
liberalization policy and economic reforms were introduced in a big way at the 
outset of 1990s. Between 1987 and 1993, returns to education had increased 
significantly for middle and secondary levels, while it remains stagnant for 
primary and higher education (Bargain, et al, 2007). On the contrary, returns to 
middle and secondary level education have fallen in 2004 over 1993 while 
returns to higher education (college) have grown (Asian Development Bank, 
2007). What we could gather from the above observation that prior to 1993 
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(pre-liberalization period), lack of demand for basic education could be reason 
for higher premium for middle and secondary education. A study by Pradhan 
and Subramanian, (2000) based on MIMAP-India Survey (Pradhan and Roy, 
2003) for 1994-95 viewed that lack of interest in schooling (demand for 
education) because of lack of expected future earnings is the major factor 
explaining low enrolment and high dropouts rates in India. Lack of market for 
higher education could possibly explain decline in returns to higher education 
during this period. Post liberalization period is marked by much higher 
productivity growth and increase contribution from service sector and skilled-
based manufacturing industries (Virmani, 2005; Bosworth et al 2006), which 
have possibly resulted in increase in premium for higher education10. It is 
unquestionably believed that India still requires higher pace of reforms towards 
the creation of a competitive market (Bajpai and Sachs, 1997; Fischer, 2000). 
It is expected that there would be a movement of the economy towards static 
and dynamic efficiency if the economy is large and open resulting in 
competitive factor prices, and gain in productivity and efficiency. This might 
change the demand for education and reorient the market-based supply. Our 
study tries to evaluate wage inequality and efficiency of the economy in the 
face of a competitive pressure over a decade of strong reforms between 1994 
and 2002.  
Recently, the productivity and efficiency aspects of growth have 
attracted considerable attention in the literature, viz. real business cycle (RBC) 
models (Kydland and Prescott, 1982 and Prescott, 1986) and endogenous 
growth models in mid-eighties (Romer, 1986, Lucas 1988). All these analyses 
emphasize the role of productivity to analyse the dynamics of economic 
growth. ten Raa and Mohnen (2002) propose that the total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth comprises three terms: Solow residual, efficiency change (X-
efficiency and allocative efficiency) and terms of trade effect. This is evaluated 
                                              
10  Absolute overall skill premium has gone up in 2002 over 1994 (see Table 3.1). 
However the overall wage ratio between skilled and unskilled has marginally gone 
down, because of better reward to the unskilled labour relative to the skilled. 
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not by using domestic prices but by competitive world prices. Following ten 
Raa and Mohnen (2002) we combine frontier approach with the applied 
general equilibrium framework, which captures the inter-linkages of the 
economy. Welfare of the economy is maximized subject to commodity, factor 
and trade constraints. This is compatible with the Negishi (1960) welfare 
program, which shows that a welfare optimum with non-zero welfare weights 
represents a competitive equilibrium such that all consumers satisfy their 
budget constraints. Competitive environment pushes the economy to its best 
production frontier with efficient utilization and reallocation of resources, and 
reorientation of trade. A production frontier reflects the potential of an 
economy. Efficiency of an economy is the performance of it compared to its 
potential. A perfectly competitive market would remove the existing 
inefficiencies of the economy. An important aspect of our study is to 
incorporate human capital formation (education process) into the productivity-
efficiency analysis as a factor for endogenous change in skilled labour supply 
that captures returns to education in the long run. Human and physical capital 
formations are two dynamic factors in our model.  
Trade liberalization has shown divergent results for skilled-unskilled 
wages in case of countries from Latin America (Hanson and Harrison, 199), 
while the East Asian countries show the convergence (Wood, 1994, 1999). 
Seminal work has gone into the issue of wage differential between skilled and 
unskilled labour in both developed and developing countries (Wood 1999; 
Katz and Autor, 1999; Williamson 1999). The explanations include skilled-
biased technological change, international trade, intuitional and supply-demand 
factors (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Learner, 1996; Krusell, et al. 1997; Berman et 
al., 1998; Kiley, 1999; Machin 2002). In the Indian context, studies have 
shown that trade openness has, in fact, has an exacerbating effect on the 
skilled-unskilled wage gap (Pradhan, 2002; Marjit and Acharya, 2003; Beladi 
and Chakraborty, 2004; Dutta, 2004). However, no clear picture has emerged 
as regards to the effect of education on the skill premium during the period of 
liberalization. While Pradhan (2002), with the help of a general equilibrium 
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model, observed that even large increases in the access to education preserve 
the wage inequality, an econometric study by Dutta (2005) found that despite 
the increase in the skill premium education has helped narrowing wage 
inequality.  
Relative wage, i.e. ratio of skilled wage to unskilled wage, defines the 
wage inequality. Factors in a competitive market are paid according to their 
marginal productivities. Competitive input prices would reflect factor 
productivities. The resultant competitive wage inequality marks the 
productivity inequality between skilled and unskilled labour, which is the skill 
productivity. Our study appraises wage inequality by comparing it with the 
productivity inequality. If the competitive wage inequality were higher than the 
observed wage inequality for a particular period, it would suggest that the 
productivity inequality is higher than the wage inequality. Our analysis 
considers two periods, 1994 and 2002, which spans the reform process of the 
economy and education. It can be noticed from the Table 3.1 that the relative 
wage has marginally declined between 1994 and 2002. We find that relative 
productivity has declined significantly during this period; in the initial period 
relative wage remains lower than the relative productivity and it’s other-way-
around in the end period.  
We introduce a decomposition exercise that captures the contribution of 
various factors, trade efficiency, human capital formation, physical capital 
formation and static allocative efficiency (efficient allocation of resources 
within a period), to the efficiency of the economy and to the ratio of relative 
productivity of skilled and unskilled labour to the relative wage. The 
decomposition is based on an extended Fisher Index approach that takes care 
of path independence due to non-linearity of the model. As elasticity of 
substitution between the skilled and unskilled labour in production process is 
expected to play important role in influencing wage differentials, we conduct 
an experiment with low as well as high degree of elasticity of substitution. The 
rest of the paper is divided into four sections. The theoretical model is 
presented in the Section 2. Section 3 analyses the basic data set and calibration. 
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The model results are discussed in the Section 4, while Section 5 gives 
conclusion and policy implication.  
 
3.2 The Model  
 
We determine the frontier of the economy by maximizing the vector of total 
final demand excluding the investment demand and net export subject to 
commodity, factor and trade deficit constraints. We assume Leontief 
preference, which keeps the relative compositions of the total final demand as 
fixed. Considering a small open economy, producers of tradable sectors take 
world prices as given. The pattern of trade is endogenous, constrained by the 
observed deficit on the balance of payment.  
Our interest is to evaluate relative wages of skilled to unskilled labour 
between 1994 and 2002 by comparing them with their relative productivities. 
Education is considered to be responsible for the skill formation over this 
period; change in skilled labour supply is endogenous in the model. We 
incorporate supply and demand of education into the model linking the two 
periods. The transformation of unskilled to skilled labour is a dynamic process. 
The investment process also captures the capital formation in the second 
period. Now assuming that agents live in both the periods, their inter-temporal 
preference includes second period’s utility function as well.  A commonly used 
additively separable inter-temporal preference function is assumed, where the 
second period’s utility is added with a discount factor, β  ( 0 1β≤ ≤ ). The 
implicit discount rate is (1 ) /µ β β= − . We follow a welfare maximization 







∑ , subject to commodity, resource and trade constraints. The 
expansion factor is defined as * 0( ) /
t t t
c D D= . *( )tD  is the value of aggregate 
final demand at the optimum for period t, while 0
t
D  is the observed value. 
Inverse of expansion factor measures the efficiency in the economy in period t.  
The inefficiency of the economy equals1 1/ tc− . 
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 Producers face a nested production function that is single period in 
nature. The Leontief production function that represents non-substitutability 
between composite intermediate inputs and value added forms the first rung of 
the nested structure. Leontief input-output function also explains the composite 
intermediate inputs as inputs are used in fixed proportions to the level of 
output. Value added follows a Cobb-Douglas function of capital and composite 
labour. Composite labour is a CES aggregation of skilled and unskilled labour.  
We assume capital is sector specific, which gives decreasing returns to scale 
with respect to composite labour. An economy may completely specialize in 
few sectors due to world price change or nearly specialize if the elasticity of 
substitution between factors is high. However, this is not a realistic scenario for 
a country like India. The most realistic way to handle this problem is to assume 
sector-specific capital, in the Ricardo-Viner spirit11. Most of the capital is 
highly specialized due to its inherent technology, product-specific, etc. The 
model allows both skilled and unskilled labour to move freely across the 
sectors in a competitive environment. We assume “downward mobility” of 
skilled labour to join the unskilled pool if they are unemployed in the skilled 
labour search12. 
                                              
11 Abrego and Whalley (2000) contended that fixed factor assumption can remove 
specialization, but this has the property that price shocks can be largely borne by the 
fixed factors, rather than by the mobile skilled and unskilled labour types. 
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tD : Aggregate final demand excluding investment and net export in period t  
 




X  :   Output of ith sector in period t 
 
t
gT  :    Net exports of g
th tradable sector in period t; g ≠ 5, 6 and 10 
 
S∆ :  Addition to stock of skilled labour in the end period over the initial 
period  
 















β :    Inter-temporal time-discount factor, takes value between 0 and 1 
 
t





f :  Share of total demand for ith sector in period t 
 
tI : Aggregate investment demand in the end period 
 
t
iτ :  Share of total investment demand coming from i
th sector in period t  
 




π :      Terms of trade in period t 
 
tλ :  Coefficients of unskilled labour joining education with respect to   
educational output in initial period  
 
ξ :      Coefficient of additional skilled labour stock in the end period with 
respect to labour joining education in the initial period 
 
iδ :     Sector-wise rate of increase in investment in the end period, 1, over the 
initial period 0 
 
tσ :    Stock of unskilled labour force going for education in the end period  
 
t
N :    Total population of labour force in period t 
 
t




C :      Supply of capital stock in period t 
t
iθ : Cobb-Douglas shift parameters for period t 
 
t
iφ  :     Cobb-Douglas share parameters for composite labour for period t 
 
t
iα :      Share parameters of skilled and unskilled labour for period t 
 
iρ :   Substitution parameters between skilled labour and unskilled labour
13 
 
The first constraint of each period is the commodity constraint, i.e. 
material balance for tradable and non-tradable sectors, while the second 
constraint represents the CES nested production function. Next three 
                                              
13 iρ  is substitution parameter between skilled and unskilled labour, which is defined 
as ( 1) /δ δ− , whereδ  is the elasticity of substitution 
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constraints are for unskilled and skilled labour, and capital respectively. The 
skilled labour demand in the initial period is constrained by an exogenously 
given skilled labour supply, and in the second period by number of initial 
period skill labour plus additional skill supplies over two periods (sees 
constraint 4). With the total labour supply ( 1N ) in period 1 as exogenously 
fixed and a part of the labour joining school (σ ), the residual determines the 
supply of unskilled labour (3). We allow unemployed skilled labour to join the 
unskilled labour pool in both the periods, which is captured by the second right 
hand side term of the unskilled constraints (3). Basically, unskilled wages sets 
the minimum wages for the skilled labour in constraint (3), while the shadow 
prices from constraints (4) reflect competitive skill premiums. Competitive 
skilled wage is the unskilled wage plus the competitive skill premium. Capital 
demand constraint (5) results in competitive rents for initial period and end 
period.  Constraint (6) states that net exports valued at world prices cannot 
exceed the existing trade deficit for each period. Shadow prices associated with 
each constraint, i.e. commodity, production function, unskilled labour, skilled 




uw ), ( i
t
SP ),  (
t
ir ) and (
tε ), represent 
competitive prices of output, value added, unskilled wage, skill premium, rent 
to capital, and purchasing power parity for both the periods.  
We have captured the dynamic process of capital and skill formation in 
a very simplistic way. Capital formation depends on the initial period 
investment. Addition to capital, net of depreciation grows at a constant long-
run rate of investment in each period. Hence, our capital formation in second 
period, 2002, depends on the initial period capital stock plus a fixed rate of 
increase in initial investment (see constraint 5). Last constraint (7) captures the 
process of skill formation with the help of education. There is 8-year gap 
between 1994 and 2002. Every year, a portion of the potential work force joins 
the school or training, i.e. education sector, in order to be transformed as 
skilled labour in some point of future. Education or training does not 
necessarily take one year to transform the unskilled to skilled labour. However, 
every year there is a net turnover of skilled labour. In period 1, number of 
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unskilled labour goes for education is proportional to educational output, 1λ . 
Change in stock of skilled labour force in period 2 (2002) over 1 (1994) 
consists of 8 sub periods. We assume that educational output grows at a fixed 
rate over the sub-periods, so also the number of unskilled labour going to 
education each period.  Considering education sector’s output as number of 
educated students, net of enrolments and dropouts, the change in stock of 
skilled labour in next sub-period is assumed to be proportional to the number 
of labour joining education in the previous period, ξ .14 Shadow prices attached 
to constraints 9 and 10 give the cost of skill formation for 2002 over 1994 
( cχ ), and opportunity cost of going for education ( eχ ) respectively in the 
optimum. In a fixed duration scenario as our concern is about the skill 
formation between two-time period, education stops playing any role in 
transforming the labour into skilled for periods afterward 2002. Hence, we 
consider the amount of workforce ( 2σ ) going to education in the end period as 
exogenous. They could be treated as the ‘reserved army’ for he future. 
First order condition of the model is reported in the Appendix of the 
paper. The dual of the skilled labour constraint (A5) gives the static and 
dynamic competitive premiums for 1994 and 2002 respectively.  
0 0 0
s s uP w w= −  
1 1 1
s s uP w w= −  
Education process culminates in the second period (2004) resulting in 
competitive skill premium. Conditions A8 and A7 show that the equivalence of 
competitive skill premium in the second period with the cost of skill 
transformation, which should be equivalent to competitive unskilled wage 












                                              
14 This is similar to poisson process where the distribution of intervals between 
successive occurrences is exponential, implying a fixed rate of occurrence. 
 39 
Competitive consumer price of education at the optimum consists not 
only of the cost of producing it, but unskilled wage forgone in the first period 
net of competitive skill premium the student expects while becoming skilled in 
the second period (see A3, A7 and A8).  
11
0 0 0 0 0 1
11 11, 11j v u s
j
P A P P w P ξ= + + −∑  
Returns to education, in our case, would be the benefit accrued to labour going 
for education to become skilled instead of remaining as unskilled, i.e. ratio 
competitive premium to competitive unskilled wage ( 1 1/
s u
P w ).  
 Equation A1 establishes price normalization condition for the general 
equilibrium model and also implicitly establishes that equilibrium prices and 














The study focuses on the efficiency of the economy and the relative 
wages under a competitive market for the year 1994 and 2002. We decompose 
the efficiency and the ratio of the relative productivity to the relative wage into 
the contributions of various factors e.g. (a) trade efficiency (b) physical capital 
formation, (c) human capital formation, and (d) static allocative efficiency. 
Due to nonlinearities in the model, sequence of decomposition can make 
difference in evaluating the significance of each of the causes on the final 
effect. Often in computable general equilibrium models (CGE) there is an 
interest to split the total effect of a package of shocks into individual or group 
effects. Harrison et al. (2000) propounded a method of decomposing the 
endogenous changes from a general equilibrium simulation into sources 
attributable to each of the exogenous shocks by using an arbitrarily accurate 
approximation to the linear path. Shorrocks (1999) proposed a decomposition 
method for sources and causes of poverty and inequality, based on the Shapley 
value. According to this, the contribution of any given source of income to 
overall change in indicator can be interpreted as the expected marginal impact 
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of the factor when such an expectation is made over all possible sequence of 
elimination, which satisfies the property of symmetry and perfect 
decomposition. Both of the above methodologies follow additively 
decomposition, which decompose the absolute difference. We are interested in 
comparing the relative wages (wage inequality) with their relative 
productivities (productivity inequality), i.e. analysing the ratio of relative 
productivity to the relative wage for both the periods. Efficiency of the 
economy is measured by the ratio of output to potential output. In our case, it 
will be more interesting and relevant to decompose the relative difference than 
the absolute difference. Hence, our decomposition mythology follows Ang et 
al. (2004), who proposed an alternative approach given in the multiplicative 
form where the relative difference is given by the ratio. 
Ang et al (2004) extended the Fisher index to n-factor model by taking 
the geometric average of all the combinations of the Laspeyres and Paasche 
indices, which satisfies the factor reversal test as well the perfect 
decomposition. Suppose the model is 1( ,..., )nV f X X= and the set {1, 2,3,4)N = . 
Aggregate value changes from 0V , the observed value to *V , the optimum. The 
multiplicative decomposition is represented by 
*
0 T E I F
V
D D D D
V
= , where TD , 
ED , ID  and FD represent the decomposed individual effect of trade efficiency, 
human capital formation, physical capital formation and static allocative 
efficiency. Let us define the functions * 0 /( ) ( , )l S m N SV S f X X∈ ∈= . Individual 


















∏  where S is 
the subset of N and s is the cardinality of S15.  This multiplicative form is 
similar to presenting the decomposition in indices.  
 
                                              
15 The mathematical description is close to Ang et al (2004). Appendix II gives 
detailed formulae for all the components.  
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3.3 Data and Calibration  
 
The basic data on sector-wise intermediate flow, final demand, investment, 
net-exports, output and value added of capital and labour for the years 1994 
and 2002 are based on the social accounting matrices (SAM) from Pradhan, et 
al. (1999) and Pradhan et al. (2006)16. The economy is classified into 11 major 
production sectors including education. The original SAMs do not categorize 
labour according to type of education and hence skill. The unskilled labour is 
defined as labour having education primary or below, while the skilled ones 
are above primary level of education. We used employment survey conducted 
by National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) 50th round, for the year July 
1993- June 1994, NSSO 55th round for the year 1999-2000 and 58th round for 
2002 to calculated sector-wise average wage rates and employment for the 1st 
and 2nd period according to level of education. Labour force is defined as 
persons engaged for longer time during the past year in any one or more work 
related economic activities (principal and subsidiary status). Working age of 
labour force is taken as between 14 and above as defined by government of 
India. We admit that our employment figure may be underestimated to that 
extent of overlooking child labour. On the basis of the above-mentioned NSS 
data the total labour force is split into working population, attending school 
and seeking for job (unemployed). Unskilled labour is defined as labour having 
education primary or below and skilled labour as having education above 
primary17. 
Values of sector-wise output, net exports, intermediate demand, final 
consumption and investment demands net of indirect taxes in real terms for 
                                              
16  A brief description about the SAM is mentioned in the Chapter 2 (Section 2.2). 
SAMs for 1994 and 2002 are reported in the Appendix III. 
 
17 Primary education is essential for good quality unskilled work in modern 
manufacturing and services, low levels of education in the labour force result in low 
quality of service and mass consumer goods while secondary education ensured that 
labour was gradually able to undertake the semi-skilled jobs that opened up as the 
economy moved to middle income level (Virmani, 2006).    
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1994 and 2002 are computed by using GDP price deflators calculated from 
information provided in the National Accounts Statistics (Government of India, 
1994, 2006). Terms of trade reflect value of Indian tradable commodities in the 
world market. We use the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database, 
which provides fairly detailed sector-wise value of imports at Indian as well as 
world market to get the terms trade for year 1995 and 2001 
(www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/databases).  For choosing value of time 
discount factor, β , we need to find time discount rate, the choice of which is a 
difficult issue, particular for developing country. We consider annualised real 
interest rate as a proxy for the time discount rate. We use lending rates and 
wholesale price indices (WPI) inflation to capture the real interest rate18. The 
real interest rate remains at the lowest in 1994 (2.40) due to high inflation and 
at the highest in 1996 (10.14). However, more or less it remains stable till 
2002. We used geometric average of the real interest rates over the period 
between 1994 and 2002 in order to get a suitable proxy for our time discount 
rate. The average annualised estimated rate is found to be 8.6 percent19. Using 
this annualised rate over 8 years from 1994 till 2002, our value of time 
discount factor, β , turns out to be around 0.5. 
The data shows that sector-wise skilled-unskilled wage differentials 
have no clear direction over time (see Table 3.1). The gap has increased for 
sectors like ‘agriculture’, ‘heavy industries’, ‘transports and storage’, and 
‘wholesale and retailed trade’ sectors; it has in fact declined for other sectors. 
We can see that there has been increase in supply of skilled labour relative to 
unskilled for all the sectors except for the ‘construction’ in 2002 over 1994. 
We may support this observation with significant increase in final demand and 
production of ‘education’ in 2002 (see Table 3.1). The all India average figures 
                                              
18 JP Morgan (2007) explains the reason for considering lending rate and WPI for the 
estimation. 
 
19  A study by Shanmugam (2006) on the rate of time preference in India 
estimated that real discount rate ranges from 7.6 to 9.7 percent. 
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show that there has been only marginal increase in skilled-unskilled wage 
difference from 1994 to 2002 with big increase in the supply of skilled labour 
over the unskilled. 
 
Table 3.1: Skilled-unskilled wages and labour supply, skill premiums, real 
output and final demand between 1994 and 2002 
 






labour Ratio of 2002 to1994 
Sectors 








allied 1,30 1,58 0,19 0,39 1.80 1,19 1,12 
Mining and 
quarrying 2,03 1,91 0,33 0,57 1.73 1,52 3,43 
Light manufacturing 1,98 1,84 0,37 0,69 1.25 1,67 2,42 
Heavy 
manufacturing 2,26 2,44 0,92 1,40 1.38 1,94 1,15 
Construction 1,58 1,46 0,31 0,55 1.03 1,79 2,01 
Electricity, gas and 
water 1,72 1,64 1,75 4,42 4.84 1,46 1,97 
Transports, storage  1,69 1,84 0,81 1,40 1.14 1,67 2,40 
Wholesale, ret. trade 1,78 1,83 0,81 1,31 2.61 1,77 2,07 
Finance, insurance, 
real est. 3,39 2,97 10,19 11,70 1.41 2,60 2,85 
Education 3,70 2,92 1,17 2,18 1.09 5,65 5,75 
Other services 3,70 2,92 1,17 2,18 1.26 2,28 2,19 
All Sectors 2.95 2.91 0.38 0.64 1.19   
 
As we could see our data section that for the computation of the primal 
model we can get most the information from the SAM and other datasets. 
However, one would face difficulties in getting estimated values of CES 
production function, for which we followed calibration technique that is 
popular in applied general equilibrium modelling20. Elasticity of substitution 
parameters play crucial role in calibration exercises. Usually in applied general 
                                              
20 For details on calibration, see Shoven and Whalley (1984), Howitt (1995), Sims 




equilibrium studies, these are acquired through either from econometrically 
estimation or with some guesstimates, i.e. prior knowledge or outside 
information. We would experiment our study by varying the elasticity 
parameters with low value of 0.5 and the significantly high one, 2.5, across the 
sectors and we assume that these parameters do not change over time21. Other 
technology parameters are calibrated for the observed economy, which remain 
unaltered during transition to frontier in particular period, but change over time 
period.  
 Our nested production function can be split into Cobb-Douglas function 
of capital and composite labour, and the composite labour as CES function of 
skilled and unskilled labour.  
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Assuming constant returns to scale as in (8) and (9) the producer’s profit 
maximization will lead to equality of factor rewards with their marginal value 
product. With algebraic manipulation of the first order conditions of the profit 
maximization program with respect to demand for capital, skilled and unskilled 
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Given exogenously the information on the sector-wise output, capital, total 
labour, skilled and unskilled labour, value added prices, total wages and skilled 
















uw ) at the observed 
                                              
21 The low elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour is a plausible 
assumption for a country like India. Jung and Thorbecke (2003) have also taken 
similar number for some African countries. 
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period, we can calibrate parameters (θ , φ , and α  ) from above equations for 




Competitive pressure would reflect potential of the economy and productivities 
of skilled and unskilled labour. We evaluate the wage inequality between 
skilled and unskilled labour for a period by setting a comparison with their 
productivity inequality. Skilled and unskilled wages in the perfectly 
competitive environment would reflect their respective productivities. 
Optimum supply of education in the first period leads to higher demand for it.  
In the second period there will be an increase in supply of skilled labour. 
Optimum investment plays important role in the capital formation for the 
second period stimulating demand for economic activity in the first period and 
supply in the second period. We implement a decomposition methodology that 
segregates the individual effects of different variables responsible for the 
change in wage ratio from the observed to competitive. Similarly, efficiency of 
the economy, i.e. ratio of observed output to the potential is also decomposed. 
Elasticity parameters are crucial for determinants of wage differentials by 
influencing the factor demand. We consider two scenarios with low and high 
elasticity of substitutions between skilled and unskilled labour. 
The analysis shows that Indian economy is operating at the 88 and 49 
percents of its potential for the periods 1994 and 2002 respectively in case of a 
lower elasticity of substitution between two types of labour (See Table 3.2). 
Similarly, in case of a higher elasticity of substitution, the economy operates at 
its 90 and 47 percents in 1994 and 2002 respectively. Introduction of perfectly 
competitive market would remove almost 50 percent of the inefficiencies of 
the economy in the long run by doubling the economic activities.  
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Table 3.2: Efficiency, competitive and observed wages for 1994 and 2002 
 
 Elasticity of 
substitutions between 




skilled and unskilled: 
2.5 
 1994 2004 1994 2002 
Efficiency  0.88 0.49 0.90 0.47 
Competitive wage ratio 
(productivity ratio) 
6.93 1.76* 3.50 2.19* 
Competitive wage ratio / 
observed wage ratio 2.35 0.60 1.19 0.75 
Competitive skilled wage / 
observed skilled wage 2.42 0.79 2.12 0.84 
Competitive unskilled wage / 
observed unskilled wage 1.03 1.30 1.79 1.12 
* Returns to education, { 1 1 1 1( / ) ( / ) 1s u s uP w w w= − }, are 0.76 and 1.19 respectively for 
the low and high elasticity of substitutions respectively. Considering 8 periods of gap, 
the annualised returns turn out to be around 7.3 % and 10 % respectively.     
 
As the competitive skill premium accounts for the cost of education 
including the wage forgone, we define the returns to education as the ratio of 
competitive skill premium to competitive unskilled wage. The annualised 
returns to education between 1994 and 2002 are found to be 7.3 and 10 
percents for the lower and the higher elasticity of substitutions respectively22. 
We report wage inequality as ratio between skilled and unskilled wages 
(relative wage). Table 3.2 shows that the productivity ratios between skilled 
and unskilled labour are much higher in the initial period than the second, 
implying higher productivity inequality in 1994 than in 2002. With a lower 
elasticity of substitution, relative productivity remains as high as 6.93 in 1994 
and drops significantly to 1.76 in 2002. However, the relative productivity 
declines significantly in 1994 with the increase in the elasticity of substitution. 
A higher elasticity of substitution reduces the difference between the relative 
productivities in 1994 and 2002. It s noticed that productivity inequality 
remains significantly above the wage inequality in the initial period and below 
                                              
22  Asian Development Bank (2007) reported returns to education for 2004 based on 
Mincerian equation, which are 6.3 and 12.3 (middle level education) for mid-carrier 
and senior workers respectively. 
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in the second period. Analysis of skilled and unskilled wages with respect to 
their competitive rewards would explicate the patterns of relative wage 
inequalities with respect to their relative productivities.  
We see from the Table 3.2 that productivity of the skilled labour is more 
than double of the observed wage in 1994 and less than the observed wage in 
2002, implying that skill labour is considerably underpaid than its productivity 
in the initial period and over paid in the second period. On the other hand, 
productivity of unskilled labour is higher than the unskilled wage in both the 
periods. Increase in economic activities, e.g. service sectors, under a 
competitive environment incites higher demand for skilled labour, which 
pushes the productivity of skilled labour higher than the base wage in the 
initial period. Due to a lower elasticity of substitution between skilled and 
unskilled labour, unskilled productivity rises only marginally higher than the 
unskilled wage in the initial period; a higher substitutability between types of 
labour increases the scope of productive potential of unskilled labour.  There is 
an increase in supply of skill labour in the second period along with a 
significant rise in economic activities that lets the productivity of skilled labour 
fall below the skilled wage and unskilled productivity rise above the unskilled 
wage.  
Giving a cursory look at the sector-wise activities in Table 3.3, we see a 
significant rise in the output of ‘other services’ and ‘education’ under a 
competitive environment compared to the observed, while ‘agriculture’, ‘light 
manufacturing’, ‘heavy manufacturing’ (particularly in the first period) and 
‘transport and storage’ sectors have shown a poor performance. The second 
period is marked by a remarkable growth in the service sectors, in general, and 
the ‘other services’, in particular, which has been largely responsible to push 
the economy to its frontier by doubling the final demand in the long run. It is 
worth mentioning here that information technology services and outsourcing 
have been major contributors to the performance of the ‘other services’ these 
days. It is expected that competitive environment and opening of the economy 
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would enhance the performance of these sectors. The significant rise in exports 
of these services would help finance the imports of other final goods. 
 
Table 3.3: Sector-wise ratio of optimal to observed output  
Elasticity of 
substitution between 




skilled and unskilled: 
2.5   
  1994 2002 1994 2002 
Agriculture and allied 0.45 0.14 0.37 0.17 
Mining and quarrying 1.11 1.02 1.06 1.02 
Light manufacturing 0.15 0.75 0.13 0.89 
Heavy manufacturing 0.38 0.99 0.37 1.14 
Construction 1.63 1.12 1.99 1.13 
Electricity, gas and water 0.71 1.47 0.71 1.57 
Transports, storage  0.71 0.54 0.74 0.61 
Wholesale, ret. trade  1.00 1.76 1.02 1.95 
Finance, insurance, real est. 1.02 1.40 1.06 1.49 
Education 2.58 2.03 2.60 2.14 
Other services 3.96 7.00 4.29 7.06 
  
In our study, trade efficiency, human capital formation (education 
process), physical capital formation (includes optimum investment), and static 
allocative efficiency are four major intertwined factors contributing to the 
performance of the economy and to the relative change in productivity 
inequality over the wage inequality. Segregation of the aggregates (efficiency 
and ratio of relative productivity to relative wage) into these four sources of 
effects reflects the significance of each of the factors. We undertake the 
decomposition exercise for both initial and final periods. If value of the change 
of aggregate factor is more than one, the positive effect of individual factor 
would be more than or equal to one. In this case, if the value of individual 
effect were less than one, it would explain the depressing effect on the 
aggregate. Efficiency of an economy is always less than or equal to one. If the 
economy were fully efficient, efficiency of the economy would be one. Ratio 
of relative productivity to relative wage could be either less or more than one. 
Efficiencies of the economy, around 90 and 50 percents for the years 
1994 and 2004 respectively suggest that the performances of the economy are 
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around 10 and 50 percents below its potential in these periods. Table 3.4 shows 
that the major reason for the inefficiency of the economy is lack of efficiency 
from free trade, followed by poor physical capital formation. Human capital 
formation has been a crucial factor for the low efficiency of the economy in the 
second period. In case of low elasticity of substitution between skilled and 
unskilled labour, the static allocative efficiency (1.07 and 1.04 for 1994 and 
2002 respectively) contributes the most in inspiring the performance of the 
economy. It adds about 7 percent and 4 percent to the efficiencies on an 
average in 1994 and 2004 respectively, while the trade efficiency (0.83 and 
0.61 for 1994 and 2002) has lowering impacts of about 17 and 39 percents for 
the initial and the second periods.  Human capital formation also, only in the 
initial period, plays an important role in the efficiency of the economy. After a 
decade of the reform process, in 2004, the economy operates almost 50 percent 
of its potential23. Importance of trade efficiency has almost doubled over this 
period. Contribution of human capital formation to the efficiency which is 1.03 
in 1994 drops to 0.84 in 2002, indicating that optimum education adds around 
3 percent on an average to the efficiency in the initial period, while an 
increased supply of skilled labour due to education process reduces the 
efficiency by around 16 percent in the second period. The pattern is almost the 
same in case of a higher elasticity of substitution as well. Inspiring an efficient 
international trade condition and an investment process could remove the 
existing inefficiencies of the economy.   
                                              
23  This could be due to our inter-temporal nature of preference, where optimal 
investment process in the initial period lead to squeeze in final demand by increasing 
the savings for propping up the capital formation in the second period.  
 50 
 
Table 3.4: Multiplicative decomposition of efficiency and productivity-












  1994 2002 1994 2002 1994 2002 1994 2002 
 Elasticity of Substitution between Skilled and Unskilled: 0.5 
Trade efficiency 0.83 0.61 4.91 2.01 3.11 1.65 0.63 0.82 
Human capital 1.03 0.84 0.88 0.32 1.03 0.67 1.17 2.13 
Physical capital 0.97 0.93 0.94 1.04 0.98 0.9 1.04 0.87 
Static allocative 
efficiency 1.07 1.04 0.58 0.92 0.77 0.79 1.34 0.86 
Total 0.89 0.49 2.35 0.6 2.42 0.79 1.03 1.30 
 Elasticity of Substitution between Skilled and Unskilled: 2.5 
Trade efficiency 0.82 0.57 1.6 1.03 2.58 1.61 1.27 1.23 
Human capital 1.03 0.85 0.95 0.74 1.02 0.74 1.15 1.25 
Physical capital 1.00 0.90 0.99 0.93 0.99 0.9 1.11 0.98 
Static allocative 
efficiency 1.07 1.07 0.79 1.07 0.81 0.79 1.1 0.75 
Total 0.90 0.47 1.19 0.75 2.12 0.84 1.79 1.12 
 
Trade efficiency is the sole factor responsible for higher productivity 
inequality compared to the wage inequality, while the static inefficiency has 
the most dampening effect on it (see Table 3.4). The ratio of relative 
productivity to the relative wage declines in the second period and it is mainly 
due to descending impact of human capital formation (education process).  
Stimulating effect of the free trade is not enough to compensate the lowering 
impact of the human capital formation. Analysing independently the skilled 
and the unskilled wages, it is noticed that trade efficiency has also significant 
contribution to the higher productivity of skilled labour vis-à-vis its wage 
irrespective of time period and degree of elasticity of substitutions. The static 
efficiency factor in the economy has a significant dampening effect on the 
increase in ratio of skilled productivity to the wage. Not surprisingly, skill 
formation (human capital formation)) has considerable reducing effect on the 
ratio of productivity of skilled labour to its wage in the second period.  It can 
be seen that inducing effect of the trade efficiency is not enough to outweigh 
the dampening effects of static allocative efficiencies, skill and capital 
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formations on productivity-wage ratio of the skilled labour in the second 
period.  
As opposed to the case of competitive skilled wage, unskilled wage 
seems to be sensitive to the degree of elasticity of substitutions between skilled 
and unskilled labour. We notice from Table 3.4 that with a lower degree of 
elasticity of substitution, the weak effect of trade efficiency is solely 
responsible for the marginally higher productivity of unskilled labour relative 
to the unskilled wage. Static efficiency contributes the maximum in raising the 
competitive unskilled wage in the first period, followed by human capital 
formation. Endogenous investment helps increase in productivity of unskilled 
labour with respect to the wage, only in marginal. As the trade efficiency (gain 
from the international integration) is oriented more towards the skilled 
activities in the initial period, the allocative efficiency spurs the demand for 
unskilled labour. There is an increase in the ratio of productivity of unskilled 
labour to its wage in the second period compared to the initial period in case of 
lower elasticity of substitution. This increase is not due static efficiency as in 
the case of initial period, but mainly because of relatively higher supply of 
skilled labour through human capital formation. On the other hand, with the 
higher elasticity of substitution, trade efficiency is largely responsible for 
higher productivity of unskilled labour relative to its wage. If the technology 
allows greater degree of substitutability between two types of labour, increased 
activities of the competitive economy due to free trade would enhance the 
demand for both types of labour. Competitive pressure with higher degree of 
elasticity of substitution results in significantly higher unskilled wage in the 
short run. Besides the trade efficiency, all other factors have almost equal 
contribution to the ratio of productivity of unskilled labour relative to the wage 
in the initial period. The productivity-wage ratio of unskilled labour is much 
less in the second period compared to the initial period. This is because, 
encouraging impacts from free trade and human capital formation in the long 
run are not high enough to sufficiently over-compensate the lower effects from 





The study has used a dynamic frontier-general equilibrium approach to 
evaluate the efficiency of the Indian economy, and the relative wages of the 
skilled and unskilled labour compared to their relative productivities. Skilled 
and unskilled wages in a perfectly competitive environment reflect their 
productivities. Time periods under consideration are 1994 and 2002. We 
decompose the efficiency of the economy and the ratio of relative productivity 
to the relative observed wage to capture the importance of various factors. The 
data shows that the observed wage inequalities (skilled-unskilled wage ratio) 
for two periods are 2.95 and 2.91. However, productivity inequalities (skilled-
unskilled competitive wage ratio) are 6.93 and 1.76 in 1994 and 2002 
respectively for the lower elasticity of substitution between skilled and 
unskilled labour, and 3.50 and 2.19 for the higher elasticity of substitution. 
Relative productivity of skilled and unskilled labour is significantly higher than 
the relative wage in the initial period and less than the relative wage in the 
second period. A lower elasticity of substitution between two types of labour in 
the initial period results in a significant increase in the skilled productivity 
compared to the observed skilled wage and only marginally for the unskilled 
labour.  However, in the second period, there is an increase in supply of skilled 
labour due to the better performance of the education sector leading to a 
decline in the productivity of skilled labour even lower than the observed 
skilled wage. The decline in skilled productivity relative to its observed wage, 
along with the rise in productivity of unskilled labour relative to its observed 
wage in the second period leads to a decline in the productivity inequality 
relative to the wage inequality in the second period. On the other hand with a 
higher elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour, 
competitive pressure lowers the ratio of level of relative productivity to the 
relative observed wage in the initial period. This is because higher elasticity of 
substitution in the initial period does not allow large increase in the 
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productivity of skilled labour relative to the productivity of unskilled labour. 
However, the optimum returns to education remains higher with a higher 
elasticity of substitution.  
Complete openness would remove the existing inefficiencies in the 
economy. The economy in the initial period operates approximately at 90 
percent of its efficiency, while the second period at 50 percent. Optimal 
investment process in 1994 leads to an increase in capital formation in 2002. In 
the absence of a completely competitive market, economy, in 2002, faces an 
under investment of resources, which is responsible for the significantly lower 
efficiency in the economy.  
In a nutshell, we conclude that 
(1) Openness of the economy and education would lead to higher 
productivity inequality than the wage inequality between 
skilled and unskilled labour in the initial period (1994). 
However, in the second period (2002), the productivity 
inequality reduces and even the relative wages remain higher 
than the relative productivities.  
(2) Relative productivity is higher in the initial period than the 
second period. There exists a significantly higher productivity 
inequality than the wage inequality in the initial period and 
other way around in the second period. However, the ratio of 
productivity inequality to the wage inequality shrinks in the 
initial period with the higher elasticity of substitution 
compared to the lower elasticity of substitution.   
(3) The annualised optimum returns to education is found to be 
around 7 percent in case of a lower elasticity of substitution 
between skilled and unskilled labour and 10 percents for a 
lower and a higher elasticity of substitution.  
(4) Efficiency from a free trade is mainly responsible for raising 
the productivity of skilled labour relative to the wage in the 
initial period irrespective of elasticity of substitutions 
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between skilled and unskilled labour. Though trade efficiency 
has also inducing effect on the productivity of skilled labour 
relative to the wage in the second period, the opposite effects 
from static allocative efficiency, human and physical 
formations, depress it. 
(5) As opposed to the case of productivity of skilled labour, trade 
efficiency reduces the productivity of unskilled labour under 
a lower elasticity of substitution. Allocative efficiency is 
more responsible for resulting in a higher productivity of 
unskilled labour than the wage in the initial period, while 
human capital formation is in the second period.  In case of a 
higher elasticity of substitution, while all the factors are 
responsible for inducing a higher productivity of the unskilled 
labour relative to the wage in the initial period, trade 
efficiency and human capital formation are in the second 
period.   
(6) Indian economy performs almost at 90 and 50 percents of its 
potential in the periods, 1994 and 2002. Competitive pressure 
would remove the existing inefficiencies by spurring the 
economic activities. Service sector activities play significant 
role in a competitive environment. The economy, in both the 
periods, is operating bellow its optimum, mainly because of 
lowering impact from trade efficiency. In the second period, 
an increased supply of skilled labour due to the education 
process (human capital formation) is also responsible for the 
lower efficiency of the economy, as this could not be matched 
by enough demand for it.   
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3.7 Appendix II 
 
The multiplicative decomposition is written as 
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3.8 Appendix III 
 
 
Social Accounting Matrix for India: 1994 

























Agriculture 5285357 10 5265521 572030 448485 4813 173982 770818 0 
Mining, 
Quarrying 3782 22909 93215 2702252 461350 971849 5622 33259 0 
Light 
Manufacture  307299 14105 3934489 764400 292759 10863 81668 587705 51188 
Heavy 
Manufacture 2038421 353277 1583613 13427761 3484477 216973 2567012 285330 32179 
Construction 394025 8784 18368 63311 39303 133569 209430 114152 611944 
Electricity, gas, 
water supply. 234189 117266 690261 1908135 56870 1423012 230622 350466 102663 
Transport, 
storage.  287181 40372 699784 1974193 599713 398938 633460 1871799 207623 
Wholesale, 
retail trade  863051 57001 1653879 2627899 784326 279609 458022 299553 110024 
Financial, real 
estate 298998 59429 517324 1651279 334303 244535 472256 520766 501414 
Education 0 0 0 922 0 0 4580 0 0 
Services 69578 55624 574069 1084187 33504 36401 403235 790374 115516 
Unskilled 10403306 304311 1415858 1429416 1057715 433399 1263385 1722181 41779 
Skilled 2524589 203751 1036818 2970115 2921209 229524 1729774 2472450 1441261 
Capital income 12948415 1309885 2344529 5957788 849079 1600102 3505515 7547870 5797849 
Private          
Government -608178 92341 772293 3928407 514208 304101 670511 287286 38403 
Capital 
Account          
Rest of World           
Total 35050013 2639065 20600021 41062095 11877301 6287688 12409074 17654009 9051843 
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Social Accounting Matrix for India: 1994 (Contd.) 
(All the figures are in Rupees 100,000) 
 




sector Government Investment 
Rest of 
the World Total 
Agriculture 41575 314579  21446103 130246 441892 154602 35050013 
Mining, 
Quarrying 0 79727  18015 964 50752 -1804631 2639065 
Light 
Manufacture  93566 308215  11223590 156148 495021 2279005 20600021 
Heavy 
Manufacture 39022 1705621  4155695 1106873 12474084 -2408243 41062095 
Construction 14072 45315  0 698378 9526650 0 11877301 
Electricity, gas, 
water supply. 21021 154332  821392 177459 0 0 6287688 
Transport, 
storage.  39131 228797  4181855 653130 392103 196415 12404494 
Wholesale, retail 
trade  36895 413002  7694715 215421 948721 1211891 17654009 
Financial, real 
estate 0 514261  3903486 56192  -22400 9051843 
Education 5104 11  1723930 1886953  0 3621500 
Services 13306 302312  2643409 5170972  83082 11375569 
Unskilled 85674 1458174      19615199 
Skilled 2633514 4036466      22199471 
Capital  588465 1458069     -1504600 42402966 
Private sector   73882068   7470600 0 1946700 83299368 
Government  10156 356687 818800  5559803 209587 1212295 -218900 13947800 
Savings   9512187  19927375 -3985123  87079 25541518 
Rest of World         0 




Social Accounting Matrix for India: 2002 























Agriculture 8152405 1571 11781772 1264603 815662 49851 210669 2468978 0 
Mining, 
Quarrying 1664 69802 341173 10767058 1581906 1397428 5328 91131 0 
Light 
Manufacture  554650 32309 6729752 1629724 914855 51623 275229 1257255 243243 
Heavy 
Manufacture 3690861 633618 3592270 26372110 7641184 986414 7480859 1649472 255013 
Construction 236515 72996 121318 158727 182523 286812 731074 149508 998683 
Electricity, gas, 
water supply. 203276 190087 1164215 2529780 468650 2802526 2010113 493602 244549 
Transport, 
storage.  1108123 188252 2677894 3620176 2203981 1078903 1589499 2126423 635126 
Wholesale, 
retail trade  1621396 87499 3766712 4766725 1884389 655281 1657142 812638 300178 
Financial, real 
estate 461287 74697 2034036 3483342 1340130 509974 1169992 1629645 1264746 
Education 0 0 0 0 0 0 8296 0 0 
Services 59155 94462 1058579 1630334 624641 322065 2842112 1662470 1345816 
Unskilled 20003634 1099511 2821145 2030973 1489810 1287990 3057349 4064936 186659 
Skilled 8116772 865493 2708599 5754988 9517104 746410 6517845 8053107 5787786 
Capital income 22206628 4277724 5504871 13033482 3138650 2961980 7851462 21762443 20395748 
Private 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Government -1139951 158293 965401 4332796 1441787 226868 2455346 646428 204084 
Capital 
Account          
Rest of World           




Social Accounting Matrix for India: 2002 (Contd.) 
(All the figures are in Rupees 100,000) 
 









Rest of the 
World Total 
Agriculture 57428 945863  38731528 217134 -323561 902512 65276415 
Mining, 
Quarrying 0 808815  63738 10620 2973978 -10266327 7846314 
Light 
Manufacture  95233 1300582  26391049 401939 1736686 3653608 45267737 
Heavy 
Manufacture 122441 7335693  9788376 2351825 14895530 -5420848 81374818 
Construction 118158 338736  0 1372891 28477331 0 33245272 
Electricity, gas, 
water supply. 7338 523601  2038292 688096 0 0 13364125 
Transport, 
storage.  343170 1207793  17012719 1217329 959129 1893798 37862315 
Wholesale, 
retail trade  195515 1748419  21641915 484852 2468501 4776874 46868036 
Financial, real 
estate 258241 1193049  18251756 394580 0 -203844 31861631 
Education 51074 458  6799103 5762915 0 0 12621846 
Services 332065 4090506  18847954 16154693 770707 856420 50691979 
Unskilled 1333291 3551117  0   -81445 40844970 
Skilled 7271673 19367539  0   -151255 74556061 
Capital  2410094 6945360  0   -1083900 109404542 
Private sector 0 0 199049173 0 21408701 0 7922899 228380773 
Government  50702 1309871 2461200 15524244 604319 4033212 -248200 33026400 
Savings   23295200 53290099 -18043494  -2550292 55991513 
Rest of World     0    0 




Chapter 4   
 






The existence of formal and informal sectors, particularly in developing 
countries, has led to much research on defining their differences24. Studies 
have shown that the formal sector is more productive than the informal sector 
because of size, capital-intensive nature of production, self-selection by more 
productive employers for the formal activities, taxation and productive public 
distribution to the formal sector (Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani, 1989; Loayza, 
1996; Webser and Fidler, 1996; Schaefer, 2002; Rogers and Swinnerton, 
2004; Kenyon and Kapaz, 2005). Our study attempts to look into the relative 
performance of formal and informal activities in India, which produce the 
same commodity with different technologies, by way of evaluating their 
productivity levels 25. We measure total productivity and account for 
intermediate inputs. As ten Raa and Shestalova (2006) contend that main 
conceptual difference among alternative measures of total factor productivity 
turns out to be prices, we measure it with competitive prices instead of 
observed prices. Observed prices are generally not efficient as they are 
marked by inefficiencies and distortions of several kinds. Competitive prices 
are the resultant of the removal of distortions with efficient utilization and 
allocation of resources when the economy is pushed to its production frontier. 
The observed prices in the productivity accounting framework are replaced by 
                                              
24 Morrisson (1995), and Marceau and Savard (1997) described the differences in 
terms of scale, legal obligations and wage dualism. 
 
25 Instead of applying the total factor productivity growth, which is useful for inter-
temporal comparison, we use relative productivity level more suitable for the 
comparison of formal and informal industries.     
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the shadow prices derived from a general equilibrium approach that 
incorporates intersectoral linkages. These shadow prices reflect the potential 
factor productivities under perfect competition. We focus on the productivity 
of existing technologies and do not address technological change induced by 
free trade. Besides finding the productivity differential between the formal 
and informal activities, this approach yields the potential productivity gain to 
the aggregate economy, if the resources were reallocated to the most 
productive activities. 
The formal-informal division in the developing countries is an 
important manifestation of the co-existence of traditional technologies and 
family enterprises, on the one hand, and modern technology on the other 
(Stifel and Thorbecke, 2003). Like most of the sub-Saharan Africa and Latin 
American countries, the informal sectors in India contribute more than 60 
percent of GDP and employ 87 percent of the labour force (Sinha et al, 2003; 
Gibson et al, 1986; Meagher, 1995; Schneider et al, 2000). Does this 
mammoth share of the informal sector contribute significantly to the health of 
the economy? The formal sector is generally thought to be more productive 
due to a better market, services accessibility and capital-intensive production 
(Webster and Fidler, 1996). It is often argued that the existence of the 
informal sector hinders the potential growth in productivity of the formal 
sector. In India, like some other developing countries, this debate has gathered 
currency at the outset of the new economic liberalization policy since the 
beginning of the 90s. Farell (2004) contended that informal software 
companies in India reduce the overall industry’s productivity and profitability 
by 90 percent and that Indian informal apparel-makers gain a 25 percent cost 
advantage over their law-abiding formal counterpart.  
The informal sector is defined as the unregistered sector with self-
employed micro-enterprises and family owned activities. The informal sector 
is marked by less or no tax payment, less capital endowment, lower 
technology, less capital, lower wages and producing wage-goods compared to 
that of formal sector. The formal sector could feature mark-up pricing due to 
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the existence of unionisation, concentration in industries, and under-
utilization of capital (Gibson and Van Seventer, 1995; Schaefer, 2002). 
Current measurement of the productivity differential between the formal and 
the informal activities requires removal of these mark-ups. The goods 
produced by formal and informal sectors can significantly compete with each 
other, as in Latin America, or they can be completely complimentary to each 
other, as in Africa (Kelley, 1994; Schaefer, 2002). We assume perfectly 
substitutable formal and informal commodities produced with different 
technologies. An efficient allocation of resources in a competitive 
environment would lead either to complete submission of production of some 
goods and services to one activity (formal or informal), or to sharing by 
equally productive activities. We evaluate the observed formal and informal 
activities at their potential competitive prices.  
We draw our basic model from ten Raa and Mohnen (2001, 2002), 
which synthesizes Solow’s growth accounting and the frontier data envelope 
analysis (DEA) in an augmented input-output optimisation model to measure 
aggregate productivity of the economy at shadow prices26. We maximize 
aggregate real consumption demand of the households with given commodity 
and factor constraints for both the formal and the informal activities. With the 
assumption of no technical change, the productivity level is solely due to 
utilization of inputs. Our index of productivity level is defined as ratio of 
value-added to total factor input cost all evaluated at shadow prices. Value-
added is the sales value of produced output net of purchased materials, i.e. 
intermediate use. The value added concept is closely comparable to the 
amount of factors of production required, i.e. gross factor cost. Gross value 
added can be rationalized as a measure of output by imposing certain 
conditions on the production function. Bruno (1978) and Diewert (1978) had 
shown that if producers behave in a profit-maximizing manner, then the 
                                              
26 DEA measures sectoral efficiency by using distance functions with respect to the 
production possibility frontier (Fare et al., 1985 and 1994). 
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replacement of gross output by deflated value-added can be justified under 
conditions that inputs are used in fixed proportions to gross output, or the 
original gross-output production is functionally separable into the 
intermediate and all primary inputs, or if the prices of outputs and 
intermediate inputs vary in strict proportion. Given the Leontief type of 
production function in our analysis with respect to intermediate and factor 
inputs, the pattern of our productivity indices across the activities and 
between the sectors based on either gross value- added or gross output would 
be unbiased (see Theorem 2 from Diewert, 1978). The productivity index 
requires aggregation among inputs and within outputs with their relative 
importance or weights. Shadow prices generated by the competitive 
equilibrium explain the relative contribution of each factor input to the unit 
production at the frontier. Value added of an efficient-productive sector 
should account for its entire factor cost. The productivity index takes a value 
between zero and one. The inefficient industries, which do not match their 
productivity their high factor cost over the output prices, will have a 
productivity index less than one. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives an 
overview of the Indian formal and informal industries. Data and the structure 
of Indian economy with respect to formal informal sectors are discussed in 
Section 3. Section 4 sets up the basic model, while the fifth section presents 
the empirical results. The last section concludes the paper. 
 
4.2 The formal and informal sectors in India 
 
Before making a quantitative analysis of productivity difference between 
formal and informal sectors, we take a cursory look at the performance and 
prospects of Indian formal and informal industries in recent years. In our 
study there are nine commodities and services in the economy. ‘Agro 
processing’, ‘readymade garments’, ‘rice milling’, ‘other manufacturing’ and 
‘other services’ are produced by both the formal and the informal sectors. 
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Besides these, ‘agriculture’ and ‘construction’ are all informal, and ‘capital 
goods’ and ‘government administration’ are all formal. The informal ‘rice 
milling’ industry, a separate unit from ‘agro processing’ is part of the rural 
economy. Once the domestic and international competition in was allowed for 
agriculture products (including rice) this industry started to grow in size with 
total investment of US$ 1.5 billion by the end 2002, of which $ 253.5 million 
was foreign investment. This induced the growth of the formal sector in the 
milling industry. ‘Agro processing’, which has been in the nascent stage in 
1990s, has been a key focus area for its value addition to agricultural produce. 
This industry consists of many fragmented units, viz. diary sector, food, fish 
and meat processing sectors, etc, for which the share of the formal and 
informal sectors vary. The industry structure and ongoing transformation offer 
opportunities for organized players of the ‘agro processing’ (including ‘rice 
milling’) to grow (IBEF, 2006). Ready-made garment constitutes around 40 
percent of the Indian textile industry, consisting of both large and small 
production retailing units. A study by Hashim (2005) shows that the textile 
industry is marred by inefficiency, contributing to the unit cost growth, and 
large-scale production (particularly in readymade garment sector) should be 
encouraged to make it more cost effective.    
Subscribing to the terminology used by Gereffi (1994), the above-
mentioned three activities (‘rice milling’, ‘agro-processing’ and ‘readymade 
garments’) could be treated as part of buyer-driven chains, where retailers 
govern the production. Traditionally, an overwhelming proportion of the retail 
market is occupied by the unorganised sector. But in order to cope with the 
intensifying competition and growing demand, the organized retail market is 
estimated to grow by 20 percent a year from the year 2000 (A.T. Kearney, 
2006). Generally, ‘other services’ could comprise of small informal transport 
sectors, informal trade, and restaurants, self-employed software units, and 
other miscellaneous services. At the same time the big enterprises like large 
transport and trading companies, hotels, banking and big software industries 
are also part of the ‘other services’. This sector has marked a significant 
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growth in 1990s. Business services, communication, community services 
(education and health), hotels and restaurants have been fast rising growth 
sub-sectors 27(Gordon and Gupta, 2003). These authors argued that that 
significant productivity gain in the service sector has been due to high-income 
elasticity of demand, increased use of input of services by other industries and 
economic reforms.  
 
4.3 Database and structure of the economy 
 
The basic data are based on the formal-informal social accounting matrix for 
1999-00 (Sinha, et al., 2004), with some modification (See Appendix I). 
There are five commodities and services produced by both the formal and the 
informal sectors. Besides these, ‘agriculture’ and ‘construction’ are all 
informal, and ‘capital goods’ and ‘government administration’ are all formal. 
The informal sector activities use ‘casual labour’ and ‘informal capital’ 
(owned by self employed), while the formal activities use both casual and 
regular labour, ‘informal capital’ and ‘formal capital’ (owned by 
entrepreneurs)28. Casual labour as opposed to the regular labour works on a 
short-term basis and can be easily displaced. Regular labour could be either 
relatively more efficient or at a more advantageous step of the job ladder. Part 
of the commodities is used as intermediate demand by both the formal and the 
informal sectors and the rest is absorbed by final demand. We assume 
intermediate consumption has the same pattern in the informal and formal 
sectors. There are eight categories of household groups, viz. casual labour, 
regular labour, self-employed and entrepreneurs, all rural or urban; these 
                                              
27 Average growth rate of service sector value added has been 7.5 percent per annum 
while the average aggregate GDP growth has been 5.8 per cent. 
 
28 Capital is defined on the basis of its ownership, viz. self-employed or employer 
(entrepreneur). ‘Formal capital’ is solely used by formal sector. Only the informal 
‘construction’ activity requires ‘formal capital’ for its production. ‘Informal capital’ 
in formal sector is owned by self-employed, who is also an employer with hiring less 
than 6 workers. 
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coefficients are defined on the basis of ownership of factor endowments. 
Profit generated from each activity is distributed among the ‘self-employed’ 
and ‘entrepreneur’ households. Profit comes more form the formal activities 
than the informal. 
The distribution of households’ factor endowments is obtained from 
the SAM. Table 4.1 shows that casual labour is concentrated in the rural area, 
while regular labour is equally share by the rural and the urban households. 
Most of the capital, both formal and informal, is held by urban households. 
 











Rural – Casual Labour 0.63         
Rural - Regular Wage 
Earner   0.50     
Rural – Self-employed    0.26    
Rural – Entrepreneur     0.03 0.03 
Urban - Casual Labour 0.37      
Urban - Regular Wage 
Earner   0.50     
Urban – Self-employed    0.74  0.24 
Urban – Entrepreneur       0.97 0.73 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
        Source: Authors’ calculation based on Sinha, et al. (2004) 
 
Table 4.2 shows that casual labour is mostly used by the informal 
sector (‘agriculture’, 44%; ‘construction’, 15%; ‘other services’, 17%), while 
regular labour is largely used by the formal sector ‘other services’ and 
‘government services’.  Though there is not a big gap between the share of 
informal capital in the formal and informal activities, this factor is 
concentrated in few sub-sectors, namely ‘agriculture’ (26%), informal ‘other 
services’ (21%), formal ‘other services’ (30%). The formal ‘other services’ 
takes the major chunk of the formal capital (62%), followed by the ‘other 
manufacturing’ (22%). The formal sector generates more profit for the 
entrepreneurs. Production of the ‘other manufacturing goods’ is the most 
profitable activities in both formal and informal sectors, followed by the 
 70 
‘capital goods’ in the formal sector. Finally, for our experiment, we assume 7 
percent of unemployment rate (Government of India, 2000) and a 70 percent 
capital utilization rate for the Indian economy. 
 













Informal            
  Agriculture 44.04  26.14  2.00 15.73 
  Agro Processing 0.86  1.11  0.36 1.79 
  Rice Milling 0.33  0.42    0.19 
  Readymade Garments 0.08  0.10  0.09 0.14 
  Other manufacturing goods 4.11  5.26  23.92 7.54 
  Capital Goods 0.00  0.00    0.00 
  Construction 14.74  2.49 6.00   6.40 
  Other Services 16.88  21.00    13.74 
  Government Services 0.00  0.00    0.00 
Total 81.04   56.52 6.00 26.37 45.52 
Formal       
  Agriculture 0.00 0,00 0.00    0.00 
  Agro Processing 0.46 0,97 1.27 2.80 0.69 2.35 
  Rice Milling 0.26 0,00 0.29 0.60   0.14 
  Readymade Garments 0.08 0,23 0.26 0.70 0.27 0.43 
  Other manufacturing goods 3.90 6,90 9.72 22.28 50.83 16.04 
  Capital Goods 0.21 2,34 2.02 5.34 21.83 4.09 
  Construction       0.00 
  Other Services 4.03 33,26 29.91 62.27   21.43 
  Government Services 10.01 56,31 0.00 0.00   10.00 
Total 18.96 100,00 43.48 94.00 73.62 54.48 
       Source: Authors’ calculation based on Sinha, et al. (2004) 
 
4. 4 Assumptions and the model 
 
Since we assume the same intermediate technology for both formal and 
informal sectors, the technological heterogeneity comes from differences in 
the intensities of primary factors of production. We model informal labour 
(casual) and informal capital qualitatively differently than their formal counter 
parts. While casual labour can freely move between the formal and informal 
sectors, regular workers are mobile only within the formal sector; the two 
types of labour are complements and regular workers have the capacity to 
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perform tasks of casual labour (if they are left unemployed in the regular 
formal work), but not the vice-versa29. This asymmetry generates a 
nonnegative competitive premium for the regular labour in the formal sector 
over the wage of casual labour. While the ‘formal capital’ and the ‘informal 
capital’ are mobile across the activities and are complements to each other, 
only the ‘formal capital’ can be used as the ‘informal capital’ (if it is found to 
be in excess supply). This results in a rent premium for the ‘formal capital’ 
over the ‘informal capital’.  
Productivity measurement requires competitive valuations of 
commodity and factors, which we derive from the following general 
equilibrium model. Assuming Leontief preference and noting that the 
conditions of the second welfare theorem hold, the competitive allocation can 
be determined by the maximal expansion of total final household 
consumption subject to the commodity and factor constraints, while 
preserving the composition of the vectors of private consumption of the 
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D :   Aggregate household consumption demand in the economy 
                                              
29 Stark (1982) assumed the existence of a ‘downward linkage’ between the formal 
sector and the informal sector in order to capture the impact of formal sector job 
creation on the informal sector.  
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e :   A unit row vector. 
 
hd :  A scalar of share of h
th
 household’s demand in the total 
(consumption weights). 
 
f :  Column vector of household’s share of consumption demand for 
a commodity.  
 
g :  Column vector of fixed final demand other than household 
consumption demand. 
 
if AA , :  Intermediate demand coefficients matrices of the formal and 
informal activities. 
 
if λλ , :  Row vector of technical coefficients of casual labour in the 
formal and informal sectors. 
 
f
l :  Row vector of technical coefficients of regular labour in formal 
sector. 
 
if κκ , :  Row vector of technical coefficients of informal capital in the 
formal and informal sectors.  
 
if kk , :  Row vector of technical coefficient of formal capital in the 
formal and informal sectors. 
 
if NN , : Total supply of formal (regular) and informal (casual) labour in 
the economy. 
 
if KK , :  Stock of formal and informal capital. 
 
The first constraint is the commodity constraint; total demand is 
constrained by the perfectly substitutable formal and informal commodities. 
The shadow price of it, p, reflects the uniform shadow price for both the 
formal and informal sectors. The two labour constraints reflect the downward 
mobility of the labour. The casual labour constraint sets the base wage, w, for 
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regular labour in formal sector. This constraint shows that demand for casual 
labour is constrained by the sum of its supply and also the unemployed 
regular labourers. The third one is the constraint for regular labour. The 
shadow price of this constraint gives the wage premium (ω ) for regular 
labour over the casual labour. The fourth constraint is for the demand and 
supply of informal capital, where demand of informal capital is constrained 
by the sum of its supply and the surplus of formal capital. Its shadow price 
sets the competitive rent ( r ) for the informal capital. The last constraint 
generates the formal capital premium, ρ .  
The national income and hence the household income and consumption 
on the frontier are evaluated at shadow prices. The equilibrating mechanism 
involves maintaining the propensity to consume at competitive prices with 
respect to the observed level for each household group with the adjustment of 
household consumption weights. In the equilibrium, the ratio of new 
propensity to consume to the observed one should be same for each household 
group. This is because, if the household’s propensity to consume at the 
optimum exceeds benchmark propensity to consume more than the other 
household, then the general equilibrium welfare maximization requires that 
former household should be assigned with higher consumption share than the 
later.  This is compatible with the welfare maximization program that shows 
that a competitive equilibrium can be represented through a welfare optimum 
with non-zero welfare weights (consumption weights) such that all consumers 
satisfy their budget constraints (Negishi 1960).  














Ki NwKrKrY γγργ +++= )( , given 
household groups’ shares fKγ and 
i
Kγ of formal and informal capital, and 
f
Nγ  
and iNγ of regular and casual labour. The new propensity to consume at 
competitive prices is 11 /)( hhh YDpfddm = , where the subscript h stands for both 
formal and informal household groups (h = 1,…,8). The observed 
propensities to consume, 0 ( )
h
m d , valued at competitive prices are similar, but 
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with the optimal consumption baskets
h h
f d D  replaced by the observed 


















, where h = 
1,…7. The maximization program is iteratively recomputed with adjusted 
consumption weights resulting in final optimum values for the endogenous 
variables.  
We thus find the optimum pattern formal and informal production 
along with the supporting shadow prices of commodities and factors of 
production. We use shadow prices to compute productivity index for each 
activity in the observed economy. Given below are the productivity indices 















































x0 are observed formal and informal production respectively. 
Our dual program, where factor costs are minimized subject to price 
constraints, besides normalizing the prices, defines the shadow prices in the 
following constraints. 
fffff wlwrkrAIp λωκρ +++++≤− )()()(  
fiii wrkrAIp λκρ +++≤− )()(  
This shows that value added of an activity must be less than or equal to 
factor costs. Equality holds for the active sectors due to complementary 
slackness (see ten Raa, 2005).  This establishes that our productivity indices 
take the value between 0 and 1.  The inefficient production activity is marked 
by the index less than 1. If we use gross output instead of the value-added, the 


















We can also notice from our dual program that the values of these indices also 
vary between 0 and 1.  
The maximization of final consumption demand in the primal program 
gives us the expansion factor, 0/* DDc = , which is considered as negative 
measure of efficiency, which compares the potential of the economy against 
the actual performance. The *D  is the value of total consumption demand at 
the optimum, while 0D  is the observed value. We could also see from the 
objective values of primal and dual that the productivity level (ratio of total 
final demand to the total factor cost evaluated at shadow prices) of overall 
economy is the inverse of the optimal expansion factor (see ten Raa, 2006). 
 Given the difference in technology between formal and informal 
activities to produce homogeneous commodities and services, the pattern of 
specialization at the frontier will depend on our substitutability and mobility 
assumption of factors of production. The gain in production efficiency is 
achieved through better production and allocation of resources. However, if 
there is an under-utilization of resources in the observed economy, the full 
utilization of them at the frontier results in an additional gain in efficiency30. 
The varying degree of degree of utilization rates among different factors of 
production affects the competitive factor prices and, hence the productivity 
differentials. This also additionally decides the pattern of sectoral productivity 
and specialization31. 
 
                                              
30
 This can be defined as X-efficiency (ten Raa, 2004). 
 
31 Besides the degree of underutilization, alternative assumptions regarding the 
mobility and substitutability of factor of production would generate different 
patterns of specialization at the frontier. 
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4.5 Model Results  
 
Our productivity level, i.e. the ratio of value added to factor cost at 
competitive prices, ranges from 0 to 1. Productivity level unit implies that 
given the competitive prices, the particular technology is efficient and hence 
is able to recover the factor costs as value added. Productivity level less than 
one suggests that it is costly to produce that commodity or service by that 
technology (formal or informal). The formal and the informal activities could 
be equally efficient in producing any goods and services if both have 
productive level of unit ratio. Table 4.3 shows that formal activities producing 
all goods and services are more productive than the informal activities. Only 
in the production of informal ‘other services’ is productive as its formal 
counterpart to produce ‘other services’.  Shadow prices for the factor of 
production that the model generates reflect the factor productivities at the 
frontier. Table 3 shows that both formal and informal capitals are the 
economically scarcest primary inputs having highest competitive rewards and 
the casual labour is the least.  
 
Table 4.3: Productivity Levels and Shadow Prices 
 
 Productivity Shadow Prices 









Agriculture  1.00 X 0.93 1.69 5.80 11.05 11.05 
Agro Processing  0.93 1.00 1.05 1.69 5.80 11.05 11.05 
Readymade Garments 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.69 5.80 11.05 11.05 
Rice Milling 0.96 1.00 1.05 1.69 5.80 11.05 11.05 
Other manufacturing  0.97 1.00 0.75 1.69 5.80 11.05 11.05 
Capital X 1.00 0.58 1.69 5.80 11.05 11.05 
Construction  1.00 X 0.63 1.69 5.80 11.05 11.05 
Other Services 1.00 1.00 1.12 1.69 5.80 11.05 11.05 
Government X 1.00 0.62 1.69 5.80 11.05 11.05 
Expansion Factor  1.38      
Note: X stands for the commodity not at all produced by either of the activities. 
 
It is also observed that optimum allocation yields no competitive 
premium for the formal capital over the informal indicating that they are 
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equally productive, while the regular labour is more productive than the 
casual labour. We see from the Table 4.2 that almost 94 percent of formal 
capital, 43 percent of informal capital and all regular labour are used by 
formal activities. Hence, it is expected that overall formal sector would be 
more productive than the informal. We could also notice that the observed 
economy is operating at an efficiency level of 0.72, which is the inverse of the 
expansion factor, 1.38. This implies that there would be a potential gain in 





We use shadow prices instead of observed inefficient prices to evaluate 
productivity differences between the formal and informal activities in Indian 
economy. Our model synthesizes the frontier analysis with the general 
equilibrium approach to generate shadow prices. Our major finding is that 
formal sector activities are strictly more productive than the informal ones 
except for the ‘service sector’, where the formal and the informal production 
technologies are equally efficient. Capitals are scarcer factors than labours 
indicating higher competitive rents than wages. Formal capital is as 
productive as informal capital and formal labour is more productive than 
informal labour.   If factors were efficiently allocated to the productive 
activities, there would be a potential productive gain of 28 percent for the 
economy. We concede that results can be refined with the help of more 




4.7 Appendix I 
 
Social Accounting Matrix for India (Formal-Informal Sectors): 1999 
(All the figures are in Rupees 100,000) 
 
    FACTORS OF PRODUCTION   HOUSEHOLDS 


















    I F F I F      
Casual Labour I           
Casual Labour F           
Regular Labour F           
Marginal Capital I           
Capital F           
Profit             
Casual Labour   420531 98386 0 0 0 0     
Regular Labour  0 0 363167 0 0 0     
Self Employed  0 0 0 874153 0 30472     
Entrepreneur   0 0 0 0 57160 96905     
Government        81623 99772 54058 16103 
Rest of the world            
Agriculture I       128407 50099 144157 3601 
Agro Processing I       13956 7801 28853 1596 
Rice Milling I       1360 581 955 99 
Readymade 
Garments I       496 368 920 50 
Other 
manufacturing 
goods I       15918 16233 13117 1619 
Capital goods I       0 0 0 0 
Construction I       0 0 0 0 
Other Services I       109362 68104 23914 10109 
Government I       0 0 0 0 
Agriculture F       0 0 0 0 
Agro Processing F       19686 20625 24105 1783 
Rice Milling F       851 382 579 60 
Readymade 
Garments F       1522 1127 966 151 
Other 
manufacturing 
goods F       48782 42447 18702 4498 
Capital Goods F       0 0 0 0 
Construction F       0 0 0 0 
Other Services F       106480 82803 93295 12216 
Government 
Services F           
Savings           505990 118177 
Total   420531 98386 363167 874153 57160 127377 528442 390342 909611 170060 
Note: ‘I’ and ‘F’ stand for informal and formal sectors respectively. 
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Social Accounting Matrix for India (Formal-Informal Sectors):  
1999 (Contd.) 
(All the figures are in Rupees 100,000) 
 
    PRODUCTION SECTORS (INFORMAL) 



























      I I I I I I I I I 
Casual Labour     228511 4487 1719 405 21306 0 76501 87602 0 
Casual Labour              
Regular Labour     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Marginal Capital     228511 9679 3708 875 45978 0 21730 183610 0 
Capital     0 0 0 0 0 0 3429 0 0 
Profit     2551 459 2 111 30472 0 0 0 0 
Casual Labour   3559 5966          
Regular Labour    27175          
Self Employed   989 3997          
Entrepreneur   0 15995          
Government              
Rest of the world   105           
Agriculture I  9330 57744 29548 722 81 13296 0 5974 13780 0 
Agro Processing I  3799 1002 1730 0 0 105 0 0 955 0 
Rice Milling I  286 2102 97 85 0 0 0 0 184 0 
Readymade 
Garments I  2211 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 18 0 
Other 
manufacturing 
goods I  -9140 6558 1340 104 806 32996 0 23450 21897 0 
Capital goods I  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Construction I  0 3160 174 31 10 886 0 1904 12166 0 
Other Services I  28823 10470 4626 130 381 20829 0 17145 39487 0 
Government I  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Agriculture F  0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 
Agro Processing F  5268 3587 2551 0 0 138 0 0 1254 0 
Rice Milling F  179 1316 61 158 0 0 0 0 115 0 
Readymade 
Garments F  6812 0 0 0 19 33 0 0 56 0 
Other 
manufacturing 
goods F  -19424 13936 2847 221 1712 70116 0 49832 46531 0 
Capital Goods F  -2385 2469 785 12 94 7697 0 7811 16141 0 
Construction F  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other Services F  46627 16938 7484 210 616 33698 0 27737 81845 0 
Government 
Services F 367952 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Savings   -69016 -125414          
Total   303589 105 578855 65868 7102 5110 277561 0 235513 505641 0 




Social Accounting Matrix for India (Formal-Informal Sectors):  
1999 (Contd.) 
(All the figures are in Rupees 100,000) 
 
    PRODUCTION SECTORS (FORMAL)     





























   F F F F F F F F F   
Casual Labour            420531 
Casual Labour  0 2374 1353 423 20231 1103 0 20935 51967  98386 
Regular Labour  0 3523 0 825 25044 8492 0 120790 204493  363167 
Marginal Capital  0 11124 2574 2296 84966 17652 0 261450 0  874153 
Capital  0 1603 343 399 12737 3055 0 35594 0  57160 
Profit  0 877 1 341 64751 27812 0 0 0  127377 
Casual Labour            528442 
Regular Labour            390342 
Self Employed            909611 
Entrepreneur            170060 
Government           52034 303589 
Rest of the world            105 
Agriculture I 0 38851 452 250 28255 46 0 22293 29081 2888 578855 
Agro Processing I 0 2276 0 0 222 0 0 1543 70 1960 65868 
Rice Milling I 0 128 52 0 0 0 0 298 15 861 7102 
Readymade 
Garments I 0 0 0 6 25 0 0 28 5 972 5110 
Other 
manufacturing 
goods I 0 1762 65 2482 70823 12108 0 35425 5346 24652 277561 
Capital goods I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Construction I 0 229 19 31 1883 540 0 19682 8279 186519 235513 
Other Services I 0 6082 81 1174 44262 8895 0 63883 19335 28549 505641 
Government I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Agriculture F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Agro Processing F 0 2991 0 0 294 0 0 2029 92 2114 86517 
Rice Milling F 0 80 33 0 0 0 0 187 9 1241 5251 
Readymade 
Garments F 0 0 0 17 71 0 0 89 15 4828 15705 
Other 
manufacturing 
goods F 0 3744 138 5275 148996 25731 0 75277 11327 39838 590526 
Capital Goods F 0 1033 8 287 16359 30682 0 26114 6638 36762 150507 
Construction F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other Services F 0 9840 132 1899 71607 14391 0 103350 31280 46520 788967 
Government 
Services F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 367952 
Savings            377703 807440 
Total   0 86517 5251 15705 590526 150507 0 788967 367952 807440  










This dissertation with the collection of three essays has addressed to a 
common issue, i.e. productivity and efficiency gain to the Indian economy due 
to perfectly competitive environment considering the inter-linkages in the 
economy. However, this common issue has been extended to discuss three 
more challenging concerns of the economy after the liberalization: welfare 
distribution, education and wage disparity under economic openness, and the 
performances of formal and informal sectors. The analytical tool combines the 
frontier analysis with the general equilibrium approach. The economy is 
pushed to its frontier while considering the intersectoral linkages. Shadow 
prices from the model are the competitive prices. The thesis has given a basis 
to explore possibilities, for study the productivity-efficiency gain linking it to 
many interesting topics of a developing economy. Given the vastness of Indian 
economy and its heterogeneous characteristics, general equilibrium analysis 
has, no doubt, been appropriate to capture the inter-linkages in the economy in 
the productivity analysis.    Chapter 2 has looked into the impact of 
competitive pressure on the productivity and efficiency gain, income 
distribution and poverty among different household groups in the Indian 
economy. We have noticed a gain in productivity and efficiency and reduction 
in poverty under competition, but the income distribution has worsened. This 
has established the scale effect of growth in the economy. Urban households 
have enjoyed significantly more reduction in poverty than the rural households. 
Households that are largely dependent on labour and land have gained little. In 
fact, the agricultural worker has even suffered from an increase in poverty. 
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Among the urban household groups, the relative gain for the salaried class has 
been low. 
Chapter 3 has considered education process in the productivity-
efficiency analysis to evaluate wage inequality and efficiency of the economy 
over the year 1994 and 2002. Wages in the perfectly competitive market define 
the productivities of the skilled and unskilled labour. It is observed that the 
annualised returns to education in 2002 has been around 7 percent in case of a 
lower elasticity of substitution between types of labour and 10 percent for the 
higher elasticity of substitution. The key observation in this essay has been that 
in 1994 productivity inequality has been significantly higher than the wage 
inequality between the skilled and the unskilled labour and just the opposite in 
2002. The steep decline in the productivity inequality in the second period has 
been mainly because of the increased supply of the skilled labour due to the 
human capital formation (education process). However, with a higher elasticity 
of substitution, the productivity inequality narrows down in the initial period. It 
is seen that trade efficiency has played a major role in raising the productivity 
of skilled labour over its wage irrespective of time period and degree of 
elasticity of substitutions. However, productivity of the skilled labour has 
remained below the wage in the second period because of the role of human 
capital formation. On the other hand, trade efficiency has a depressing effect 
on the productivity of the unskilled labour relative to its wage in case of a 
lower elasticity of substitution and a positive effect in case of a higher 
elasticity of substitution. Static allocative efficiency has contributed the most 
in raising the productivity of unskilled labour above its wage in the initial 
period and the human capital formation in the second period.  
It is noticed that the economy operates almost at 90 percent of its 
efficiency in 1994, while only around at 50 percent in 2004. Perfect 
competition would remove existing inefficiencies in the economy to extent of 
10 and 50 percents in 1994 and 2002 respectively. It is shown that trade 
efficiency should be given more importance as an engine to push the economy 
to perform at its potential. Service sectors would contribute the most to the 
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performance of the economy at its potential. Higher physical and human 
capital formations in the second period require more demand and utilization of 
resources. It is not only the lack of trade efficiency, human and physical capital 
formations are also responsible for the lower efficiency of the economy in the 
second period. 
Chapter 4 has deviated from the first two chapters towards the 
discussion of relative performance of formal and informal sectors in terms of 
their productivity differentials. We have evaluated the productivity levels of 
the formal and informal activities with the help of competitive prices rather 
than observed inefficient prices. The study has shown that formal activities 
would be more productive than the informal. However, the informal service 
sector would be as efficient as the formal one. There would be an overall 
productivity gain of 28 percent to the economy if factors were allocated to 
productive activities. Shadow prices of the model have reflected that the formal 
capital and informal capital are the scarce factors at the optimal-efficient 
allocation and both are equally productive. On the other hand, formal labour is 
more productive than its informal counterpart. 
The dissertation, no doubt, leaves scope for further improvement. Like 
many other applied models, the analyses are greatly constrained by proper data 
availability, particularly for the reliable sector-wise capacity utilization rate of 
capital. The models in the thesis have not dealt with the provision of public 
goods and the government sector activities. With the availability of the social 
account matrix related to the formal-informal sectors for a second period, the 
study in the Chapter 4 could be extended to deal with the change in 
productivity (performance) of formal and informal sectors over two time 
periods during the period. A decomposition exercise (additive or 
multiplicative) could also be conducted to capture the relative contribution of 
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Sinds 1991 volgt India een drastisch economisch hervormingsprogramma. 
Het doel van het programma is het verhogen van het globale 
concurrentievermogen en het verwijderen van de bestaande ondoelmatigheden in 
de economie. Een prestatiegerichte economische omgeving is een vereiste voor 
het bereiken van hogere productiviteit. De economische liberalisatie had twee 
belangrijke doelen. Ten eerste, efficiënt gebruik van inputs werd bevorderd door 
beperkingen erop te verminderen en door beperkingen op de keuze van 
technologie op te heffen. Ten tweede, het openen van de economie voor de 
krachten van de globale concurrentie leidde tot verdere toename van effectiviteit. 
Dit proefschrift stelt een productiviteit-effectiviteits analyse voor, die rekening 
houdt met de interne verhoudingen in de Indiase economie. De analyse is verder 
uitgebreid op onderwerpen die belangrijk zijn in het huidige India, zoals een 
concurrerende omgeving, inkomensverdeling, armoede, loonongelijkheid tussen 
hoog- en laaggeschoolden, opbrengsten van opleiding en prestatie van de formele 
en informele sector.  
Wij proberen de bovenstaande onderwerpen in drie onafhankelijke 
artikelen te vangen. Ons model gebruikt zowel de frontier analysis, alsmede de 
algemeen-evenwicht benadering om schaduwprijzen te genereren. Deze laatste 
weerspiegelen de competitieve prijzen. Relaties tussen sectoren worden 
gemodelleerd met behulp van input-output tabellen. De social accounting matrix, 
die een grote rol speelt in het vaststellen van de koppelingen in de economie, 
vormt het primaire databestand voor ons model. De matrix combineert nationale 
rekeningen met input-output tabellen en inkomensverdelingsdata van huishoudens 
in een gegeven periode.  
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Het eerste paper behandelt hoe een versterkte concurrentie de 
inkomensverdeling en armoede van huishoudens beïnvloedt. Wij onderzoeken de 
groei van effectiviteit en productiviteit, veroorzaakt door toenemende 
concurrentie, en de verdelingeffecten in het kader van een algemeen-evenwicht 
input-output model. Efficiënt gebruik van beschikbare bronnen, technische 
vooruitgang en vrije handel zijn onze oorzaken van groei. De welvaart stijgt als 
gevolg van toenemende concurrentie, maar de inkomensverdeling zou schever 
worden. Huishoudens op het platteland zouden er op achter uitgaan ten opzichte 
van stedelijke huishoudens. Armoede in steden zou veel sterker dalen dan op het 
platteland, de armoede van de landbouwarbeider zou zelfs toenemen. De studie 
laat zien dat concurrentie een positief effect heeft op effectiviteit, productiviteit en 
armoede, maar een negatief effect op de inkomensverdeling in de Indiase 
economie.  
Het tweede paper beoordeelt de effectiviteit van de economie en de 
loonongelijkheid tussen laag- en hooggeschoolden in de competitieve omgeving 
van de intensieve hervormingen tussen de jaren 1994 en 2002. Wij simuleren een 
perfect competitieve economie, waarin de competitieve lonen productiviteit 
weerspiegelen. Wij vergelijken arbeidsproductiviteit met de geobserveerde lonen. 
Een eenvoudig twee-perioden model wordt gebruikt in onze frontier-productivity 
analyse om voor de kennistransformatie (opleiding) in de periode te zorgen. De 
jaarlijkse opbrengsten van opleiding zijn geschat op ongeveer 7 en 10 procent 
voor respectievelijk de lage en hoge substitutie-elasticiteit tussen laag- en 
hooggeschoolden. De studie laat zien dat in de eerste periode de ongelijkheid in 
productiviteit groter is dan de loonongelijkheid en kleiner in de tweede periode. 
De reden hiervoor is dat de waargenomen lonen van hooggeschoolde arbeiders 
lager zijn dan hun productiviteit in de eerste periode en hoger in de tweede. De 
efficiëntie als gevolg van handel heeft de productiviteit van hooggeschoolde 
arbeid, in vergelijking met het loon, in beide perioden doen stijgen. De 
accumulatie van menselijk kapitaal in de tweede periode is een cruciale factor in 
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het verlagen van de productiviteit van geschoolde arbeid ten opzichte van het 
loon. In beide perioden blijft het efficiëntieniveau van de economie lager dan het 
potentiële niveau; het is veel lager in de tweede periode. Het gebrek aan handels 
efficiëntie is een cruciale factor in de verklaring voor de lagere efficiëntie van de 
economie. Echter, de accumulatie van het menselijke en fysieke kapitaal, welke 
niet gevolgd wordt door voldoende vraag in de tweede periode is tevens een 
belangrijke factor in het verklaren van de afnemende efficiëntie. De concurrentie 
zal de bestaande inefficiënties in de economie verwijderen. 
Het laatste essay evalueert de prestaties van de formele sector in 
vergelijking met die van de informele sector in India. Dit wordt gedaan door het 
verschil in productiviteit te bestuderen. Bij het berekenen van de competitieve 
algemeen-evenwicht prijzen wordt expliciet rekening gehouden met de onderlinge 
verhoudingen van sectoren. Deze prijzen zijn een indicatie van de productiviteit. 
De formele activiteiten blijken productiever dan de informele. De informele 
dienstensector is echter even efficiënt als de formele. Indien de productiefactoren 
efficiënt worden toegewezen aan productieactiviteiten, dan zou de economie een 
algemene productiviteitstijging kennen van 28 procent. De schaduwprijzen van 
het model geven aan dat het formele en informele kapitaal schaars zijn, terwijl het 
omgekeerde geldt voor formele en informele arbeid. Formele arbeid is 
productiever dan informele; formeel kapitaal en informeel kapitaal zijn beiden 
even productief.  
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